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ESSAYS 
SACRIFICING LEGITIMACY IN A HIERARCHICAL 
JUDICIARY 
TaraLeigh Grove* 
Scholars have long worried about the legitimacy of the Supreme 
Court. But commentators have largely overlooked the inferiorfederal 
judiciary-andthe potentialtradeoffs between Supreme Court and lower 
court legitimacy. This Essay aims to call attention to those tradeoffs. 
When theJusticesareasked to changethe law in high-profileareas-such 
as abortion, affirmative action, orgun rights-theyface a conundrum: 
To protect the legitimacy of the Court, theJustices may be reluctant to 
issue the broadprecedents that will most effectively clarify the law-and 
thereby guide the lower courts. The Justices may instead opt for narrow 
doctrinesor deny review altogether. But such an approachputs tremen-
douspressureon the lower courts, which must take the leadon the content 
of federal law in these highprofile areas. Presidents, senators, and 
interestgroups then zero in on the composition of the lower courts-in 
ways that threaten the long-term legitimacy of the inferior federal 
judiciary. Drawingon political science and history, this Essay explores 
these legitimacy tradeoffs within ourfederaljudicialhierarchy. To the 
extent that ourlegal system aims to protect the legitimacy of thejudiciary, 
we should consider not simply the Supreme Court but the entirefederal 
bench. 
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INTRODUCTION 
From time to time, Supreme Court watchers predict that we are on 
the verge of a constitutional revolution.1 Many commentators today 
1. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Foreword: The 
Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 22, 24-25 (1992) [hereinafter Sullivan, 
Justices] (noting that after Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush "filled five 
vacancies," various "Court-watchers claimed ... a conservative revolution was at hand"); 
Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux & Laura Bronner, How a Conservative 6-3 Majority Would 
Reshape the Supreme Court, FiveThirtyEight (Sept. 28, 2020), https://fivethirtyeight.com/ 
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forecast a sea change in the Court's jurisprudence on high-profile issues, 
such as abortion,2 affirmative action, gun rights,' and the administrative 
state.5 Although some observers celebrate this prospect,6 many others fear 
the anticipated revolution.7 Accordingly, the Supreme Court is 
increasingly under fire. Critics have questioned the Court's legitimacy8 
and called for structural reforms that would have been almost unthinkable 
a few years ago, including "packing" the Court with additional members.9 
features/how-a-conservative-6-3-majority-would-reshape-the-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/ 
ZD9R-8VV3] (asserting that "the chances of 'a conservative revolution' on the court are 
high"); see also Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional 
Revolution, 87 Va. L. Rev. 1045, 1051-61 (2001) (discussing "a veritable revolution in 
constitutional doctrine" with respect o federalism and civil rights). 
2. See Clare Huntington, Abortion Talk, 117 Mich. L. Rev. 1043, 1044 (2019) (noting 
that many "anticipate significant" changes "if not a complete repudiation of Roe v. Wade"). 
3. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court and Public Schools, 117 Mich. 
L. Rev. 1107, 1117 (2019) (predicting that "there are now five justices to strike down all 
affirmative action programs"). 
4. See Adam Liptak, Justice Barrett's Vote Could Tilt the Supreme Court on Gun 
Rights, N.Y. Times (Nov. 30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/30/us/supreme-
court-barrett-gun-rights.html (on file with the ColumbiaLaw Review) (noting the anticipated 
changes to Second Amendment doctrine). 
5. See Gillian E. Metzger, The Supreme Court, 2016 Term-Foreword: 1930s Redux: 
The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 3-4 (2017) [hereinafter Metzger, 
Administrative State] (critiquing "contemporary anti-administrativism"). 
6. Some commentators endorse certain aspects of the predicted change in doctrine. 
See, e.g., John Yoo & James Phillips, Roberts Thwarted Trump, but the Census Ruling Has 
a Second Purpose, Atlantic (July 11, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/ 
2019/07/liberals-helped-roberts-undercut-bureaucratic-state/593737 (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) (celebrating that "[t]he counterrevolution is on ... against an 
administrative state run amok"); see also Joyce Lee Malcolm, Defying the Supreme Court: 
Federal Courts and the Nullification of the Second Amendment, 13 Charleston L. Rev. 295, 
311 (2018) (arguing that "[i]t is long past time for the Supreme Court" to protect the 
Second Amendment). 
7. See supra notes 2-5. 
8. The attacks on the Court's legitimacy were ignited in part by recent confirmation 
battles: Critics argue that Republicans used underhanded means to cement a conservative 
majority on the Court-and thereby make possible a constitutional revolution. See Tara 
Leigh Grove, The Supreme Court's Legitimacy Dilemma, 132 Harv. L. Rev. 2240, 2240-42 
(2019) [hereinafter Grove, Legitimacy Dilemma] (discussing the controversies urrounding 
Merrick Garland, Neil Gorsuch, and Brett Kavanaugh and the attacks on the Court's 
"legitimacy"); see also, e.g.,John F. Harris, The Supreme Court Is Begging for a Legitimacy 
Crisis, Politico (Oct. 29, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/10/ 
29/supreme-court-begging-for-legitimacy-crisis-433573 [https://perma.cc/UZ3C-L2A4] 
(arguing that the confirmation of Amy Coney Barrett "days before a presidential election" 
undermines the Court's legitimacy). 
9. See Opinion, How to Fix the Supreme Court, N.Y. Times (Oct. 27, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/10/27/opinion/supreme-court-reform.html 
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (collecting proposals); Larry Kramer, Pack the 
Courts, N.Y. Times (Oct. 27, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/10/27/ 
opinion/pack-supreme-court.html (on file with the ColumbiaLaw Review). Some critics call 
for a federal statute imposing term limits on Supreme Court Justices. See John Kruzel, 
Dozens of Legal Experts Throw Weight Behind Supreme Court Term Limit Bill, Hill (Oct. 
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Whatever one thinks of the merits of the anticipated legal changes (or 
structural reforms), it seems that all eyes are on the Supreme Court. 
This Essay argues that the narrow emphasis on the Supreme Court 
overlooks the broader reality of the federal judiciary. The Court cannot 
achieve legal change unilaterally; it must act through the lower federal 
courts.10 And with respect to high-profile issues, the Justices may face a 
twofold dilemma: unappealing tradeoffs between legitimacy and legal 
change, and between Supreme Court and lower court legitimacy. 
Let us begin with the first tradeoff: To most effectively ensure legal 
change on high-profile and contested issues, the Court should clarify the 
law through broad, rule-like precedents. Although ideology plays a limited 
role in most lower court decisions, empirical research suggests that judges 
are more likely to vote in predictable "conservative" or "progressive" 
directions on issues such as abortion, affirmative action, or gun rights." As 
a result, the Supreme Court should take special care to guide-or "rein 
in"-its judicial inferiors in these areas. But the Justices may feel 
considerable pressure not to issue broad, rule-like doctrines in precisely 
23, 2020), https://thehill.com/regulation/court-battles/522447-dozens-of-legal-experts-
throw-weight-behind-supreme-court-term-limit [https://perma.cc/WRW9-B6LM]. Suzanna 
Sherry advocates a statute prohibiting concurring and dissenting opinions-to reduce the 
emphasis on individual Justices' votes. See Suzanna Sherry, Our Kardashian Court (and 
How to Fix It), 106 Iowa L. Rev. 181, 182 (2020). Dan Epps and Ganesh Sitaraman have 
provocatively called for either a fifteen-member Supreme Court or one that would 
consist of nine-member panels drawn from the entire pool of federal appellate court 
judges. See Daniel Epps & Ganesh Sitaraman, How to Save the Supreme Court, 129 Yale 
L.J. 148, 181-84 (2019) (proposing a "Supreme Court Lottery," under which the Court 
would consist of all federal appellate court judges, who would randomly serve on nine-
Justice panels for two-week periods); id. at 193-96 (proposing in the alternative a 
"Balanced Bench," which would encompass a fifteen-member Court, with five affiliated 
with the Democratic Party, five affiliated with the Republican Party, and the remaining five 
selected by the first ten); see also Stephen E. Sachs, Supreme Court as Superweapon: A 
Response to Epps & Sitaraman, 129 Yale L.J. Forum 93, 94-100 (2019) (critiquing the 
proposals). But much recent discussion focuses on expanding the size of the Supreme Court 
(a reform that is often described as "court packing"). See Richard Wolf, Pack the Court? 
Battles Between Republicans and Democrats Fuel Clash over Supreme Court's Future, USA 
Today (Oct. 25, 2020), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/10/25/ 
could-amy-coney-barretts-confirmation-fuel-supreme-court-expansion/3716562001 
[https://perma.cc/H2ZD-QDN4]. The calls for court packing push against a strong norm. 
See Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Historical Gloss, Constitutional Conventions, and the 
Judicial Separation of Powers, 105 Geo. L.J. 255, 278-87 (2017); Tara Leigh Grove, The 
Origins (and Fragility) of Judicial Independence, 71 Vand. L. Rev. 465, 505-17 (2018) 
[hereinafter Grove, Judicial Independence]; see also infra notes 315-320 and 
accompanying text (noting other proposed Court reforms). 
10. This Essay focuses on the lower federal courts, which seem most likely to handle 
the hot-button issues that are the focus of so much commentary today. State court legitimacy 
raises important but different questions, which I hope to address in later work. 
11. See infra section IILA; see also Lee Epstein, William E. Landes & Richard A. 
Posner, The Behavior of Federal Judges: A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Rational 
Choice 168, 213-14, 237 (2013) (reporting that "ideological voting is less frequent" in the 
lower courts than in the Supreme Court). 
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these high-profile contexts-particularly when the Justices perceive that 
the Supreme Court is under attack. Broad doctrinal rules raise the stakes 
of any decision and could invite additional attacks against the Court or 
even lead to noncompliance. Accordingly, the Justices may be tempted to 
issue narrow decisions or flexible standards or to deny certiorari in high-
profile cases-and allow the lower federal courts to work out the details. 
In short, to preserve the external reputation (sociological legitimacy) of 
the Supreme Court, the Justices may opt not to issue the broad, rule-like 
doctrines most conducive to legal change. 
But that leads to a second tradeoff: There are considerable risks to 
the lower courts when they must take the lead on the content of federal 
law in high-profile areas. As noted, absent clear guidance from the 
Supreme Court, inferior federal judges tend to be more influenced by 
ideology in ruling on certain high-profile cases, such as those involving 
abortion or affirmative action. At a minimum, political actors and interest 
groups assume that the law in these areas will depend on the composition 
of the lower federal courts.12 This assumption puts pressure on Presidents 
and senators to emphasize judicial ideology in lower federal court 
appointments. And, indeed, over the past several decades, the selection of 
inferior federal courtjudges has grown increasingly partisan and divisive. 13 
Some research suggests that this very divisiveness undermines public 
respect for-that is, the legitimacy of-the lower federal courts.1 4 
We thus see the twofold dilemma: To avoid sacrificing the legitimacy 
of the Supreme Court, the Justices may sacrifice both meaningful legal 
change and the long-term legitimacy of the inferior federal bench. 
Two prominent historical episodes vividly illustrate this conundrum.1 5 
The "all deliberate speed" formula in Brown Hwas, in significant part, an 
effort to protect the Court's public reputation; the Justices worried that 
segregationists would refuse to comply with a firm deadline." This opaque 
test, in turn, both sacrificed meaningful legal change and delegated 
desegregation to the inferior federal judiciary-leading to some of the 
earliest lower court confirmation wars. In PlannedParenthoodv. Casey, the 
Justices-again, to protect the Court's sociological legitimacy-declined 
either to overrule Roe v. Wade or to retain its broad, rule-like trimester 
framework.17 Instead, the Court crafted the "undue burden" standard, 
which inferior federal judges have applied in distinct and often 
12. See infra section III.C.1. 
13. See infra section III.C.1. 
14. See infra section III.C.3. 
15. See infra Part II. 
16. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown Ii), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (directing federal 
district courts to enforce desegregation orders with "all deliberate speed"). 
17. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878-79 (1992) (plurality 
opinion) (O'Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.) (rejecting "the rigid trimester framework of 
Roe v. Wade" while reaffirming the case's "central holding"). 
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ideologically predictable ways. 18 This test has also raised the stakes for-
and the contentiousness of-lower court selection. 
Recent events underscore the risks to the inferior federal judiciary. 
There seems to have been an uptick in negative rhetoric about the lower 
courts-including, specifically, accusations that federal judges decide 
cases on ideological grounds. President Trump, for example, denounced 
adverse lower court rulings as the handiwork of "Obama judges."" 
Although ChiefJustice Roberts and other jurists have pushed back against 
the charge that there are "Obama judges" or "Trump judges," 20 some 
commentators insist that lower court judges vote in ideologically predicta-
ble directions. 21 This commentary has, however, failed to appreciate that 
any such ideological voting depends in significant part on Supreme Court 
precedent. The Court could rein in its judicial inferiors through broad, 
rule-like doctrines-and thereby help protect the public reputation of the 
lower federal courts. But the Justices may opt instead for opaque tests in 
an effort to safeguard the reputation of the Court itself. 
This analysis has important implications for constitutional scholarship 
and jurisprudence. First, this account pushes against the assumption of 
some scholars that the Supreme Court can easily resolve controversial iss-
ues of constitutional law and thereby launch a constitutional revolution. 22 
To the extent that the Justices are concerned about the Court's public 
reputation, they may be least inclined to resolve precisely those issues on 
which lower courts most need guidance.23 
18. See id. at 874-79; infra notes 154-157 and accompanying text (discussing how 
lower federal courts have applied the "undue burden" standard). 
19. See infra notes 236-238 and accompanying text. 
20. Mark Sherman, Roberts, Trump Spar in Extraordinary Scrap overJudges, AP News 
(Nov. 21, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/c4b34f9639e141069c08cfle3deb6b84 
[https://perma.cc/Q9SG-TVDL]; see also Jess Bravin, No Obama or Trump Judges Here, 
Appointees of Both Declare, Wall St. J. (Sept. 15, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
judges-say-they-arent-extensions-of-presidents-who-appointed-them-11568566598 (on file 
with the Columbia Law Review). 
21. See Ramesh Ponnuru, The Chief Justice's Defense of the Federal Judiciary, Nat'l 
Rev. (Nov. 21, 2018), https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/chief-justice-john-roberts-
defends-the-federal-judiciary (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing that Chief 
Justice Roberts's statement that there are no "Obama judges or Trump judges" is "pretty 
obviously untrue" because "[t]he decisions of judges appointed by Clinton and Obama 
generally differ, in predictable ways, from the decisions of judges appointed by Bush and 
Trump"); Marc A. Thiessen, Opinion, Chief Justice Roberts Is Wrong. We Do Have Obama 
Judges and Trump Judges., Wash. Post (Nov. 23, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
opinions/chief-justice-roberts-is-wrong-we-do-have-obama-judges-and-trump-judges/2018/ 
11/23/ee8de9a2-ef2c-11e8-8679-934a2b33be52_story.html (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review). 
22. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text; see also Larry Alexander & Frederick 
Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1359, 1385 
(1997) (viewing the Court "as the authoritative settler of constitutional meaning"). 
23. This analysis thus links up with the important literature on "stealth overruling" or 
"narrowing" of Supreme Court precedents. Compare Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth 
Overruling (with Particular Attention to Miranda v. Arizona), 99 Geo. L.J. 1, 4-5 (2010) 
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Second, and more fundamentally, this analysis underscores that 
scholarship on judicial legitimacy has focused too narrowly on the 
Supreme Court.24 Many scholars argue that the justices shoulddecide cases 
with an eye to protecting the Court's sociological legitimacy. 5 Alexander 
Bickel and Cass Sunstein, for example, urge the Court to issue narrow 
("minimalist") rulings or deny certiorari in controversial matters so as to 
avoid provoking external criticism. 6 These scholars have overlooked the 
impact that such narrow or nonexistent decisions may have on the long-
term legitimacy of the remainder of the federal bench. As this Essay 
underscores, once we take into account the entire judicial system, it is far 
from clear which level of the federal judiciary is better equipped to 
shoulder external attacks. 
At the outset, a few points of clarification. First, this Essay focuses on 
sociological legitimacy: the external reaction to the decisions of the 
Supreme Court and the lower federal courts. But this Essay does not simply 
consider the reaction of the general public; the broader public is often 
unaware of the actions of the judiciary, particularly the lower courts. 
Accordingly, this Essay also considers-as relevant to sociological 
legitimacy-the perspective of government officials and political elites 
(including interest groups) who tend to care deeply about judicial 
decisionmaking.2 7 When the Justices refrain from issuing a broad ruling, 
they may be concerned about the reaction of any of these external 
(criticizing "stealth overruling"), with Richard M. Re, Narrowing Precedent in the Supreme 
Court, 114 Colum. L. Rev. 1861, 1865-66 (2014) (defending "narrowing"). 
24. See infra Part I and section IV.B. 
25. See, e.g., Deborah Hellman, The Importance of Appearing Principled, 37 Ariz. L. 
Rev. 1107, 1151 (1995) (arguing that "the Court must take care to preserve the esteem in 
which it is held"); Gillian E. Metzger, Considering Legitimacy, 18 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 
353, 364 (2020) (asserting that "concerns about preserving public support for the Court 
fall within the bounds of reasonable constitutional adjudication"); Tom R. Tyler & Gregory 
Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment of Discretionary Legal Authority: The United 
States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 43 Duke L.J. 703, 712 (1994) ("The Court wisely 
attends to its legitimacy in the eyes of the public. . . ."); Michael L. Wells, "Sociological 
Legitimacy" in Supreme Court Opinions, 64 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1011, 1051 (2007) (urging 
that the Court should decide cases so as to preserve "sociological legitimacy"); infra Part IV. 
26. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the 
Bar of Politics 69-72, 132, 250-56 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter Bickel, Least Dangerous 
Branch]; Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time:Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court 
3-23, 39-41 (1999) [hereinafter Sunstein, One Case]; infra section IV.B. 
27. Over the past several decades, Presidents, senators, and interest groups have 
increasingly zeroed in on the lower federal courts. See infra sections II.A.3, II.B.3, III.C.1. 
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groups. 28 Likewise, any of these groups may zero in on the composition of 
the inferior federal courts.2 9 
Second, this Essay does not claim that there is a legitimacy tradeoff 
with respect to every constitutional question. The analysis here focuses on 
legal issues that are both highly salient and contested, such as abortion, 
affirmative action, and gun rights. In less salient (or less contested) areas 
of constitutional law, the Justices may have little to lose in articulating clear 
doctrine, and lower court nominees are unlikely to be quizzed about their 
views on low-profile issues. But notably, the category of highly salient and 
contested areas is not a static one. An issue may become more or less 
salient over time. 30 This Essay thus does not aim to define a fixed set of 
highly salient and contested issues but instead seeks to identify a 
phenomenon-legitimacy tradeoffs within the federaljudicial hierarchy-
that can arise with respect to whatever divisive issues exist at a given point 
in our constitutional development. 
Finally, this Essay does not argue that the contentious nature of lower 
court selection can be traced exclusively to Supreme Court doctrine. 
There are several interrelated factors, including the rise in party polariza-
tion, the growing influence of interest groups, and changes in Senate 
procedure. 31 But the historical events and social science research can-
vassed in this Essay demonstrate that the Court's doctrinal choices are an 
important-and largely overlooked-contributing factor. 
28. Scholars debate whether the Justices are primarily concerned about the views of 
elites or the general public. For purposes of this Essay, it is sufficient to assume-to the 
extent the Justices consider external views-that they may care about any of these external 
groups. Compare Neal Devins & Lawrence Baum, The Company They Keep: How Partisan 
Divisions Came to the Supreme Court, at xi (2019) (arguing that the Justices are "elites who 
seek to win favor with other elites"), with Barry Friedman, The Will of the People: How 
Public Opinion Has Influenced the Supreme Court and Shaped the Meaning of the 
Constitution 16 (2009) [hereinafter Friedman, Will of the People] (arguing that the 
Supreme Court "ratif[ies] the American people's considered views about the ... 
Constitution"), and Jeffrey Rosen, The Most Democratic Branch: How the Courts Serve 
America 3 (2006) (arguing that Supreme Court decisions often reflect public opinion better 
than Congress). 
29. See Nancy Scherer, Scoring Points: Politicians, Activists, and the Lower Federal 
Court Appointment Process 21-22 (2005) (emphasizing interest group influence over 
judicial nominations); Amy Steigerwalt, Battle over the Bench: Senators, Interest Groups, 
and Lower Court Confirmations 10-13 (2010) (recognizing that, at least by the 1980s, 
interest groups focused on lower court confirmations); see also Lauren Cohen Bell, Warring 
Factions: Interest Groups, Money, and the New Politics of Senate Confirmation 8-12 (2002) 
(discussing interest group influence in executive andjudicial nominations). 
30. As discussed below, abortion became a more divisive matter in national politics 
after the Court's decision in Roe v. Wade. See infra section II.B.1. 
31. See Sarah A. Binder & Forrest Maltzman, Advice & Dissent: The Struggle to Shape 
the Federal Judiciary 145 (2009) [hereinafter Binder & Maltzman, Advice] (emphasizing 
the importance of the "institutional rules and practices" of the Senate); Scherer, supra note 
29, at 4-5, 21-22 (arguing that "the parties use [lower court] nominations to curry favor 
with only an elite constituency within each party"); Benjamin Wittes, Confirmation Wars: 
Preserving Independent Courts in Angry Times 57-60 (updated paperback ed. 2009) 
2021] SACRIFICING LEGITIMACY 1563 
The analysis proceeds as follows. Part I introduces readers to the liter-
ature on legitimacy, which has long emphasized the Supreme Court alone. 
Part II then provides a historical overview of how the Court has struggled 
to provide clear guidance on high-profile issues, such as desegregation and 
abortion, and both Parts II and III explore how that lack of guidance 
impacts the lower federal courts. Finally, Part IV examines how this analysis 
implicates normative debates overjudicial legitimacy, minimalism, and the 
passive virtues. Jurists and scholars, this Essay contends, should begin to 
reckon with the legitimacy tradeoffs within our hierarchical system. 
I. THE (OVER) EMPHASIS ON SUPREME COURT LEGITIMACY 
There is a rich literature on the legitimacy of the Supreme Court. Po-
litical scientists focus on sociological legitimacy, arguing that the Court 
can function effectively only if it has external support.32 After all, the Court 
has no army; it must rely on others to comply with its decrees. 33 
Government officials and the general public are more likely to obey if they 
view the Court as "legitimate"-that is, as an institution that should have 
the power to determine legal rights and obligations.34 It is particularly 
important that those who disagree with a given ruling view the Court as 
legitimate; such disappointed individuals will respect the adverse decision 
if they consider the institution itself to be authoritative. 35 Political scientists 
thus often say that "legitimacy is for losers." 36 
Political scientists disagree about the source and nature of the 
Supreme Court's sociological legitimacy. Many scholars argue that the 
(tracing "the decline of the [lower court selection] process ... to the growth of judicial 
power that began with the Brown decision"); Keith E. Whittington, Partisanship, Norms, and 
Federal Judicial Appointments, 16 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 521, 530 (2018) [hereinafter 
Whittington, Partisanship] (emphasizing growing party polarization). 
32. See, e.g., Brandon L. Bartels & Christopher D. Johnston, On the Ideological 
Foundations of Supreme Court Legitimacy in the American Public, 57 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 184, 
184 (2013) ("For an institution like the U.S. Supreme Court to render rulings that carry 
authoritative force, it must maintain a sufficient reservoir of institutional legitimacy .... "). 
33. See Mark D. Ramirez, Procedural Perceptions and Support for the U.S. Supreme 
Court, 29 Pol. Psych. 675, 675 (2008) (noting that "the Supreme Court does not possess the 
budgetary power of Congress or the enforcement power of the President"). 
34. See James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Citizens, Courts, and Confirmations: 
Positivity Theory and the Judgments of the American People 38-39 (2009); Bartels & 
Johnston, supra note 32, at 184. 
35. See Gibson & Caldeira, supra note 34, at 38-39 ("Legitimate institutions are those 
recognized as appropriate decision-making bodies even when one disagrees with the 
outputs of the institution." (emphasis omitted)). 
36. E.g., James L. Gibson, Milton Lodge & Benjamin Woodson, Losing, but Accepting: 
Legitimacy, Positivity Theory, and the Symbols ofJudicial Authority, 48 Law & Soc'y Rev. 
837, 839 (2014). 
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Court enjoys broad "diffuse support."37 Under this view, the public gener-
ally sees the Court as performing a different function from the political 
branches and treats its decisions as reasonable and binding, regardless of 
the outcome of a specific case. 38 But a growing literature challenges this 
perspective. The challengers-"specific support" scholars-argue that 
members of the public tend to support the Court only if they like the 
results in specific high-profile cases. 39 In other words, "individuals grant or 
deny the Court legitimacy based on the ideological tenor of the Court's 
policymaking."40 
Notably, even diffuse support scholars assert that public respect for 
the Supreme Court is contingent, at least in the long run. Recall that it is 
crucial for the "losers" to view the Court as an authoritative decisionmaker 
so that they will respect an adverse decision. Scholars agree that a series of 
adverse decisions in salient cases could lessen the Court's support among 
a particular group.41 If the Supreme Court, for example, repeatedly issued 
"conservative" (or "progressive") decisions in high-profile cases, its insti-
tutional reputation would eventually decline with the "loser" group. 
Accordingly, both camps agree that the Supreme Court's decisions in 
high-profile cases can affect its sociological legitimacy, at least in the long 
37. Political scientists differentiate "specific support" (support for a single Court 
action) from "diffuse support" (long-term support, regardless of the Court's actions). See 
Walter F. Murphy & Joseph Tanenhaus, Public Opinion and the United States Supreme 
Court: Mapping of Some Prerequisites for Court Legitimation of Regime Changes, 2 Law & 
Soc'y Rev. 357, 370 (1968). 
38. See Gibson & Caldeira, supra note 34, at 61-62 ("[S]upport for the Court has little 
if anything to do with ideology and partisanship."); James L. Gibson & Michael J. Nelson, 
Changes in Institutional Support for the U.S. Supreme Court: Is the Court's Legitimacy 
Imperiled by the Decisions It Makes?, 80 Pub. Op. Q. 622, 623-24 (2016) (offering empirical 
support for the conventional view that diffuse support is "sticky"). 
39. See Bartels & Johnston, supra note 32, at 185-87 (arguing that high-profile cases, 
i.e., those that "receive ample attention from the media and political elites, are important 
topics in election campaigns, and have facilitated the formation of significant ideological 
cleavages in American politics," play an outsized role in how the "mass public" forms 
opinions about the Court's legitimacy); Neil Malhotra & Stephen A. Jessee, Ideological 
Proximity and Support for the Supreme Court, 36 Pol. Behav. 817, 819 (2014) (finding that 
individuals "who are ideologically closest o the Court's position tend to exhibit the highest 
levels of trust and approval"); see also Dino P. Christenson & David M. Glick, Chief Justice 
Roberts's Health Care Decision Disrobed: The Microfoundations of the Supreme Court's 
Legitimacy, 59 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 403, 415-16 (2015) (finding that public attitudes can be 
changed by "a single, albeit salient, case"); supra note 37 (defining "specific support"). 
40. Bartels & Johnston, supra note 32, at 185. 
41. See Gibson & Caldeira, supra note 34, at 43 (" [G]ver the long haul, the repeated 
failure of an institution to meet policy expectations can weaken and even destroy that 
institution's legitimacy in the eyes of disaffected groups."); see also id. (noting that support 
for the Court among African Americans has declined in recent decades); James L. Gibson 
& Michael J. Nelson, The Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court: Conventional Wisdoms 
and Recent Challenges Thereto, 10 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 201, 206-07 (2014) (" [T]he 
Court's diffuse support could suffer once some accumulated threshold level of 
dissatisfaction is reached."). 
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run. And for those who accept the "specific support" view, any individual 
decision in a salient case may affect the Court's external reputation. 
This possibility raises a challenging normative question for jurists and 
legal scholars: Should the Justices decide cases so as to preserve the 
sociological legitimacy of the Court? A number of scholars argue yes, 
emphasizing that the Court cannot function without some level of external 
support.42 Others raise questions about whether any such consideration of 
sociological legitimacy is legally legitimate-that is, a normatively accept-
able mode of legal reasoning.43 But at a minimum, scholars seem to agree 
that the Justices do decide at least some high-profile cases so as to protect 
the sociological legitimacy of the Court.4 4 
This Essay will return to some of these normative questions. For now, 
the important point is that this debate over legal and sociological legiti-
macy focuses almost exclusively on the Supreme Court.45 Lost in the 
discussion is the inferior federaljudiciary. But this Essay aims to show that, 
to the extent the Justices decide cases so as to protect the public reputation 
of the Court, they may create risks for the remainder of the federal bench. 
As Part IV discusses, once we expand our focus to the entire federal 
judiciary, the normative question-should the Justices decide cases so as 
to protect the Court's legitimacy?-becomes ignificantly more nuanced 
and complex. 
42. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text; infra sections IV.B-.C. 
43. See infra section IV.B.1; see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Law and Legitimacy in the 
Supreme Court 21 (2018) [hereinafter Fallon, Law and Legitimacy] (distinguishing 
sociological, moral, and legal legitimacy); Robert C. Post & Neil S. Siegel, Theorizing the 
Law/Politics Distinction: Neutral Principles, Affirmative Action, and the Enduring Legacy 
of Paul Mishkin, 95 Calif. L. Rev. 1473, 1473-74 (2007) (examining the tension between 
"the social legitimacy of the law as a public institution" and "the legal legitimacy of the law 
as a principled unfolding of professional reason"). 
44. See Fallon, Law and Legitimacy, supra note 43, at 111 (asserting that "the Justices 
might [under threat] feel externally constrained to adopt positions that they think 
constitutionally erroneous"); Or Bassok, The Sociological-Legitimacy Difficulty, 26 J.L. & 
Pol. 239, 240-42, 272 (2011); Erin F. Delaney, Analyzing Avoidance: Judicial Strategy in 
Comparative Perspective, 66 Duke L.J. 1, 3-4 (2016); Allison Orr Larsen, Judging "Under 
Fire" and the Retreat to Facts, 61 Wm. & MaryL. Rev. 1083,1090-91 (2020); see also Michael 
D. Gilbert & Mauricio A. Guim, Active Virtues, 98 Wash. U. L. Rev. 857, 860 (2021) (arguing 
that the Justices should not only avoid controversial cases but also take on politically 
uncontroversial cases-what he authors call "unity cases"-in order to bolster the Court's 
external legitimacy). 
45. There is at least one exception. Neil Siegel argues that the Supreme Court can at 
times work together with the lower courts to promote the external legitimacy of the entire 
federal judiciary. See Neil S. Siegel, Reciprocal Legitimation in the Federal Courts System, 
70 Vand. L. Rev. 1183, 1186-87 (2017) [hereinafter Siegel, Reciprocal Legitimation]. 
Section III.D discusses Siegel's thoughtful piece in greater detail. For now, it is enough to 
note that Siegel does not address the issue at the heart of this Essay: the legitimacy tradeoffs 
within the federal judicial hierarchy. 
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II. PRESSURE ON THE LOWER FEDERALJUDICIARY 
To illustrate the tradeoffs faced by the federal judiciary, this Essay 
begins with two prominent historical examples: the aftermath of Brown v. 
Board ofEducationand PlannedParenthoodv. Casey. These episodes vividly 
show how the Supreme Court's doctrinal choices may not only fail to 
achieve meaningful legal change but also put tremendous pressure on the 
inferior federal courts. Although there is a voluminous literature on 
desegregation and abortion-and different scholars have recounted 
aspects of the stories told here (accounts that this Essay draws upon)-
prior scholars have not focused on the lesson of this Essay: what these 
episodes have to tell us about the legitimacy tradeoffs within the federal 
judicial hierarchy. 
A. The Consequences of "All DeliberateSpeed" 
1. The Creation of 'All Deliberate Speed". - In 1954, the Supreme Court 
announced its watershed unanimous ruling in Brown, declaring that, "in 
the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no 
place."4 6 But the Court did not issue a remedy. Instead, the Justices 
scheduled the case for reargument to determine how the Court should 
carry out its constitutional ruling.47 
During the oral argument in Brown If, then-NAACP attorney 
Thurgood Marshall implored the Justices to establish a firm deadline for 
desegregation, directing that the process be complete by September 1956 
at the latest.48 Absent a clear deadline, Marshall warned, "[T] he Negro in 
this country would be in a horrible shape," as the lower courts allowed the 
"several states [to] decide in their own minds as to how much time was 
necessary." 4 9 Indeed, Marshall suggested that an open-ended standard 
might leave students "worse off" than the "separate but equal" doctrine 
because it would be challenging for NAACP attorneys to show when a 
school district was violating the law.50 "In separate but equal," Marshall 
explained, "we could count the number of books, the number of bricks, 
the number of teachers and find out whether the school was physically 
46. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) ("Separate educational facilities 
are inherently unequal."). 
47. See id. at 495-96 & n.13 (directing further argument over whether the Court 
should itself "formulate detailed decrees" or instead "remand to the [district] courts" and, 
if the latter, "what general directions" the Court should offer). 
48. Transcript of Oral Argument, Brown II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Nos. 1 to 5), in 
Argument: The Oral Argument Before the Supreme Court in Brown vs. Boardof Education of 
Topeka, 1952-55, at 337, 393-94 (Leon Friedman ed., 1969) [hereinafter Brown II 
Transcript] (urging the Court to "put a date certain" on desegregation (quoting Thurgood 
Marshall)); see also MichaelJ. Klarman, FromJim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court 
and the Struggle for Racial Equality 313 (2004) (noting that the NAACP "pressed for 
immediate desegregation"). 
49. Brown IITranscript, supra note 48, at 400 (quoting Thurgood Marshall). 
50. Id. 
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equal or not."51 But if the Court issued an opaque test to govern 
desegregation, "enforcement of [Brown] will be left to the judgment of the 
district court with practically no safeguards."5 2 
By contrast, the other participants in the case urged the Court to 
proceed with caution. U.S. Solicitor General Simon Sobeloff argued that 
the Court should require desegregation only "as speedily as feasible"-to 
allow an "effective gradual adjustment." 53 And the attorneys for the states 
argued for virtually unlimited district court discretion:54 The Court should 
"trust the district judge to carry out the constitutional provisions" even if, 
in some school districts, "it may well prove impossible to have 
unsegregated schools in the reasonably foreseeable future." 55 Indeed, the 
South Carolina attorney general suggested that it may be necessary to wait 
until society was ready for desegregation-a change that might not occur 
until "2015 or 2045."156 
Notwithstanding the pleas of the NAACP, and the candor of some 
state attorneys, the Justices were wary of issuing a firm decree. As other 
scholars have recounted, the Justices worried that "[t]he more specific and 
immediate the relief ordered, the greater the chances of defiance" by 
segregationists.57 And any such noncompliance would harm the Supreme 
Court's public reputation. 58 As Justice Black put it during the internal 
deliberations over the case, "[N] othing could injure the court more than 
to issue orders that cannot be enforced." 59 
Accordingly, the Court in Brown Hinstructed district courts to "enter 
such orders . . . as are necessary and proper" to school systems to ensure 
desegregation "with all deliberate speed." 60 To be sure, as Justin Driver 
emphasizes, the Court's decision did not purport to authorize indefinite 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 508-09 (quoting Simon E. Sobeloff). 
54. See J.W. Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men: Southern Federal Judges and School 
Desegregation 16 (1961) (noting that the southern lawyers argued for a "wide-open 
mandate" (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
55. Brown IlTranscript, supra note 48, at 420-21 (quoting Robert McCormick Figg). 
56. Id. at 412 (quoting S.E. Rogers) (arguing that parts of South Carolina could not 
easily "push the clock forward abruptly to 2015 or 2045"). 
57. Klarman, supra note 48, at 314; see also Jeffrey K. Staton & Georg Vanberg, The 
Value of Vagueness: Delegation, Defiance, and Judicial Opinions, 52 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 504, 
505, 507 (2008) (arguing that Brown Ilillustrates how the Court may issue "vague" decrees 
out of concern for the "institutional prestige" of the Court). 
58. See Klarman, supra note 48, at 314 (noting "the justices' concern about issuing 
futile orders" and how that could undermine "the Court's prestige"). 
59. Friedman, Will of the People, supra note 28, at 246 (quoting Justice Black and 
other Justices concerned about noncompliance); see also Klarman, supra note 48, at 314 
(recounting the Justices' internal deliberations). 
60. Brown , 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). 
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delays. 61 The Court declared that the lower courts should "require ... a 
prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance with our [Brown] 
ruling."62 Yet largely out of concern for the Court's sociological legitimacy, 
the Justices declined to issue the firm deadline requested by the NAACP. 
As Michael Karman observes, the Justices seemingly "valu[ed] the Court's 
prestige-its dignity interest in avoiding the issuance of futile orders-over 
the plaintiffs' constitutional rights[] ."6 
2. Sacrificing Meaningful Change. - Many scholars have recognized 
that the Supreme Court's decision in Brown II failed to produce 
meaningful legal change.64 As Charles Ogletree laments, "the Court 
removed much of the force of its [Brown] decision by allowing proponents 
of segregation to end it not immediately but with 'all deliberate speed.' . . 
This compromise left the decision flawed from the beginning. "65 Indeed, 
even ten years after Brown, fewer than two percent of Black schoolchildren 
attended integrated schools.66 Derrick Bell thus forcefully charges: 
"Having promised much in its first Brown decision, the Court in Brown II 
said in effect that its landmark earlier decision was more symbolic than 
real. "6 
Brown II failed to achieve meaningful legal change in large part 
because it delegated to the lower courts the task of defining "all deliberate 
speed." And federal district judges implemented the ruling in vastly 
different ways. In 1964, political scientist Kenneth Vines found what he 
described as "extreme differences among the judges in the disposition of 
race relations cases." 68 According to Vines, federal judges during this era 
61. See Justin Driver, The Schoolhouse Gate: Public Education, the Supreme Court, 
and the Battle for the American Mind 256-58 (2019) ("Brown II contained some 
countervailing language, now generally forgotten, suggesting that the Court would not 
countenance substantial delays .... "). Perhaps for that reason, Thurgood Marshall 
suggested in private correspondence that he was satisfied with the Brown II decision. See 
Richard Kluger, Simple Justice: The History of Brown v. Board of Education and Black 
America's Struggle for Equality 749-50 (2d ed. 2004). 
62. Brown II, 349 U.S. at 300. 
63. Klarman, supra note 48, at 314. 
64. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Case Against the Supreme Court 138-39 (2014) 
(arguing that the Warren Court "deserves a good deal of the blame" for "racial segregation 
in education" because "[t]he Court gave no deadlines or timetables[] [and] prescribed no 
techniques or approaches to desegregating schools"); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, From Brown 
to Bakke: The Supreme Court and School Integration: 1954-1978, at 126 (1979) (urging 
that "southern school desegregation ran a most uneven course"). 
65. Charles J. Ogletree,Jr., All Deliberate Speed: Reflections on the First Half Century 
of Brown v. Boardof Education, atxiii (2004). 
66. See Kluger, supra note 61, at 755. 
67. Derrick Bell, Silent Covenants: Brown v. Board of Education and the Unfulfilled 
Hopes for Racial Reform 19 (2004) [hereinafter Bell, Silent Covenants]. 
68. Kenneth N. Vines, Federal DistrictJudges and Race Relations Cases in the South, 
26J. Pol. 337, 348 (1964). Notably, Vines did not focus exclusively on school desegregation 
cases. But his findings are consistent with historical accounts about the implementation of 
Brown during this era. See infra notes 71-83 and accompanying text. 
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fell into three camps: "integrationists" who ruled in favor of most civil 
rights claims, "segregationists" who rejected most such claims, and 
"moderates" who fell between the other two extremes.69 In fact, according 
to Vines, there were extremes within these camps: From 1954 to 1962, four 
judges ruled for civil rights plaintiffs in more than ninety percent of cases, 
while sevenjudges never granted relief to a single civil rights claimant. 70 
Historical accounts corroborate these findings. Some judges 
("integrationists") went to great lengths to make the Brown promise a 
reality. Then-District Judge J. Skelly Wright, for example, "courageously 
and imaginatively enforced" desegregation in New Orleans, Louisiana.71 
By contrast, other judges ("segregationists") were openly hostile to 
Brown.7 1 In Dallas, Texas,Judge T. Whitfield Davidson declined to "name 
any date or issue any order" for desegregating the public schools, stating 
that "the white man has a right to maintain his racial integrity and it can't 
be done so easily in integrated schools." 73 
The "all deliberate speed" formulation enabled segregationist judges 
like Davidson to resist desegregation. But the lack of clarity in Brown Iwas 
perhaps most problematic for judges in the moderate camp-the bulk of 
the southernjudiciary. 74 Although these judges were less hostile to Brown, 
they were reluctant to issue firm desegregation orders because they would 
face severe repercussions from their local communities. As then-Professor 
J. Harvie Wilkinson explained: 
Brown II gave trial judges little to hide behind. The enormous 
discretion of the trial judge in interpreting such language as 
"prompt and reasonable start" and "all deliberate speed" made 
his personal role painfully obvious. If the judge did more than 
the bare minimum, he would be held unpleasantly accountable. 
Bold movement meant community opprobrium. Segregationists 
were always able to point to more indulgentjudges elsewhere.75 
Other commentators have offered a similar assessment. 76 In 1961, 
political scientistJack Peltason argued that "[t] he directions of the United 
69. See Vines, supra note 68, at 349. 
70. See id. at 348-49. 
71. Victor S. Navasky, Kennedy Justice 272 (1977); see also Jack Bass, Unlikely Heroes 
112-35 (1981) (discussing Judge Wright's efforts). 
72. See, e.g., Comment, Judicial Performance in the Fifth Circuit, 73 Yale L.J. 90, 97-
98 (1963) (describing how a Savannah federal judge "denied the requested injunctive relief 
'solely on the basis' of a factual finding that ... integrated schools were harmful to both 
races"). 
73. Peltason, supra note 54, at 118-19 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Judge Davidson); see also Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About 
Social Change? 91 (paperback ed. 1993) (noting Judge Davidson's resistance to Brown). 
74. See Peltason, supra note 54, at 8; infra notes 75-83 and accompanying text. 
75. Wilkinson, supra note 64, at 80-81 (footnote omitted). 
76. See Bell, Silent Covenants, supra note 67, at 19 ("The judge who, in trying to 
enforce Brown, did more than the bare minimum, would be held unpleasantly accountable 
by the very active, vocal, and powerful opposition that surrounded him."); see also Lawrence 
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States Supreme Court" in Brown II were "not clear and explicit, and this 
[was] the crucial problem." 77 Absent the cover of a clear higher court 
decision, district judges who "issued antisegregation orders, however 
mild," would be socially ostracized, receive threatening letters and anony-
mous and obscene phone calls, and likely need extra security.78 Consider, 
in this regard, the experience ofJudge Wright, who pushed for desegrega-
tion in New Orleans. The judge received death threats, witnessed a cross-
burning on his lawn, and needed an around-the-clock security detail.79 As 
Jack Bass puts it, "By the end of 1960, Skelly Wright had become the most 
hated man in New Orleans . .. . With few exceptions, old friends would 
step across the street to avoid speaking to him." 0 
By contrast, a judge "who delay[ed] injunctions and avoid[ed] anti-
segregation rules" would be "a local hero."81 For many judges, the choice 
was clear.82 According to Peltason, that is exactly what the southern state 
attorneys hoped for in Brown II: "If they could persuade the Supreme 
Court to leave the exact timing and precise nature of integration orders to 
the discretion of southern federal judges, they knew they could operate 
segregated schools for a long, long time."83 
The courts of appeals could, of course, provide some guidance to 
district judges. In 1967, Fifth Circuit Judge John Minor Wisdom argued 
that appellate courts had an obligation to step in: "District courts are ... 
understandably loath" to issue desegregation orders "without firm 
mandates" from higher courts. 84 Circuitjudges, Wisdom emphasized, "are 
not more courageous or more enlightened than district judges. They are 
Baum, Lower Court Response to Supreme Court Decisions: Reconsidering a Negative 
Picture, 3 Just. Sys. J. 208, 214-15 (1978) (noting that southern judges "could suffer 
opprobrium and isolation as a result of a perceived devotion to civil rights"); Michael W. 
Giles & Thomas G. Walker, Judicial Policy-Making and Southern School Segregation, 37J. 
Pol. 917, 918 (1975) (observing that "the district courts have not relished altering local 
customs by judicial decree"). 
77. Peltason, supra note 54, at 13 (urging that southern districtjudges "can hardly be 
expected on their own initiative to move against the local power structure"). 
78. Id. at 10. 
79. See Bass, supra note 71, at 115 ("Pairs of federal marshals alternated in eight-hour 
shifts at [Judge Wright's] home to ensure his physical safety, and they escorted him to and 
from work."). 
80. Id. 
81. Peltason, supra note 54, at 9 (recounting that such a southern judge "will hear 
himself referred to as one of the nation's 'great constitutional scholars"'). 
82. Many judges permitted delays or required at most "token compliance." Wilkinson, 
supra note 64, at 81-82; see also Comment, supra note 72, at 99-100 ("Delay, and the ability 
of district courts successfully to administer it, is at the heart of the problem in the Fifth 
Circuit."). 
83. Peltason, supra note 54, at 13; see also Rosenberg, supra note 73, at 89 (finding 
that "Southern segregationists" fought to "vest control of civil rights in lower-courtjudges"). 
84. John Minor Wisdom, The Frictionmaking, Exacerbating Political Role of Federal 
Courts, 21 Sw. L.J. 411, 420 (1967) (arguing that, "[t]o fill the vacuum" left by the Supreme 
Court, "the circuit court must step in"). 
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just not on the firing line .... ."85 Judge Wisdom observed that the same 
reasoning extended to his superiors: "The Supreme Court, almost wholly 
removed from the local scene, by this criterion has an obligation to lead 
or at least point out the logical line of development of the law." 86 But the 
Court had failed to fulfill that function in school desegregation cases. 87 
Accordingly, "because of the dearth of explicit directions ... from the 
Supreme Court," the courts of appeals were "forced into a policy-making 
position."88 
There were, however, important differences among-and within-
the courts of appeals as well. Although several members of the Fifth 
Circuit, including Judge Wisdom, were among "the most prominent 
integrationists," other appellate judges were far more resistant to Brown.89 
Fifth Circuit Judge Ben Cameron, for example, was known for his states' 
rights philosophy and open hostility to desegregation and, on that basis, 
became a "hero in Mississippi. "90 
3. A More Contentious Appointments Process. - In the wake of Brown II, 
Presidents and senators began to realize that the content of "all deliberate 
speed" would depend tremendously on the composition of the inferior 
federal bench. So political actors sought to ensure that a lower federal 
court nominee would vote the "correct way" in civil rights cases. In this 
post-Brown II era, we thus see the early seeds of the divisiveness that 
characterizes our modern judicial selection process. 
Notably, this focus on judicial ideology was a significant change. For 
much of American history, lower federal court appointments were 
patronage, not policymaking, opportunities. 91 Moreover, senators tended 
to be in charge of this patronage: Under the norm of senatorial courtesy, 
Presidents deferred to the wishes of home-state senators, at least when they 
were from the same political party as the President.92 When both home-
85. Id. Notably, Congress has long required federal district judges to live in the district 
to which they were appointed. See Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-773, § 134, 62 Stat. 
869, 896 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 134(b) (2018)) (stating that, with few 
exceptions, "[e]ach district judge ... shall reside in the district or one of the districts for 
which he is appointed"). 
86. Wisdom, supra note 84, at 420. 
87. See id. at 420-21 (" [T]he general direction [of] 'all deliberate speed' has allowed 
a wide variety of action at both the district court and appellate levels."). 
88. Id. at 426-27. 
89. Navasky, supra note 71, at 269 (noting that the Fifth Circuit contained a mix of 
"integrationists," "moderates," and "segregationists"); see also Sheldon Goldman, Picking 
Federal Judges: Lower Court Selection from Roosevelt Through Reagan 126-31 (1997) 
[hereinafter Goldman, Picking Federal Judges] (discussing the judges on the Fourth and 
Fifth Circuits). 
90. Bass, supra note 71, at 84-96. 
91. See Steigerwalt, supra note 29, at 3; see also Scherer, supra note 29, at 13 (" [L]ower 
courtjudgeships [were long] ... distributed to friends and campaign contributors .... "). 
92. See Steigerwalt, supra note 29, at 4-5 ("Beginning with George Washington, 
presidents deferred to [home-state] senators .... "). Senators took the lead with respect to 
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state senators were from an opposing party, Presidents often turned to 
other same-party state officials to suggest nominees. 93 To be sure, this 
patronage system meant that Presidents usually selected individuals from 
the same political party. But Presidents and senators rarely focused on how 
lower court judges were likely to vote on specific legal issues.94 
Moreover, in the mid-twentieth century, ajudge's partisan affiliation 
did not say very much about how he9 5 might vote on high-profile issues like 
desegregation. The Democratic and Republican parties were internally di-
vided on civil rights; there were social progressives and social conservatives 
in both parties. 96 Likely in part for that reason, Vines found that 
"integrationist," "moderate," and "segregationist" judges were not neatly 
divided along party lines.97 
In the wake of "all deliberate speed," however, Presidents and 
senators increasingly emphasized judicial ideology, at least with respect to 
civil rights. The presidential administrations of the 1950s and 1960s largely 
pushed for judges who would support integration. Although President 
Eisenhower had a somewhat tepid attitude toward Brown,98 he largely 
delegated judicial selection to his Justice Department, 99 and his Attorneys 
not only district court but also most appellate court nominees; a seat on a regional circuit 
court was seen as designated for a particular state. See Goldman, Picking Federal Judges, 
supra note 89, at 136. 
93. See Goldman, Picking Federal Judges, supra note 89, at 135 (discussing how the 
Eisenhower administration turned to Republican leaders in southern states, "which had no 
Republican senators in the 1950s"). 
94. There were some notable exceptions. For example, after watching lower court 
judges repeatedly strike down New Deal legislation, President Franklin Roosevelt paid closer 
attention to which individuals were elevated to the inferior federal bench (although he was 
still also guided by "more traditional party considerations"). Id. at 30-31; see also Binder & 
Maltzman, Advice, supra note 31, at 33 (finding that, in the nineteenth century, political 
actors sometimes noted a nominee's views on the Fugitive Slave Act). 
95. This Essay uses the pronoun "he" because the patronage system almost entirely 
excluded female nominees to the lower federal bench. See Goldman, Picking Federal 
Judges, supra note 89, at 357. 
96. See Morris P. Fiorina, Divided Government 1 (2d ed. 1996) (observing that, by 
1968 and 1972, the Democratic Party was still "hopelessly split" over civil rights); Keith E. 
Whittington, Political Foundations ofJudicial Supremacy: The Presidency, the Supreme Court, 
and Constitutional Leadership in U.S. History 268-69, 273 (2007) [hereinafter Whittington, 
Political Foundations] (noting that, by the mid-twentieth century, both parties had 
"integrat[ed] disparate ideological elements ... that persistently resisted the direction of 
presidential and party leadership"). 
97. Interestingly, Vines found that Republican judges were "disproportionately among 
the Moderates and Integrationists." Vines, supra note 68, at 350. He suggested that 
Republican appointees may have been less keyed into the social circles of the South-and 
thus less likely to care about social ostracism for supporting Brown. See id. at 351. 
98. President Eisenhower's view of Brown is a matter of dispute. Compare 2 Stephen E. 
Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President 190 (1984) ("Eisenhower personally wished that the 
Court had upheld Plessy v. Ferguson.... "), with Goldman, Picking Federal Judges, supra 
note 89, at 127 (arguing that Eisenhower later came to support Brown because he "believed 
it was his duty to carry out the Court's rulings"). 
99. See Goldman, Picking Federal Judges, supra note 89, at 113, 123. 
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General, Herbert Brownell and William Rogers, strongly supported 
desegregation.10 0 President Kennedy had campaigned in part on a 
platform of advancing civil rights,101 and both he and his successor Lyndon 
Johnson endeavored to place integrationists on the bench. 102 Indeed, in 
discussing lower court nominees, President Johnson would often direct 
White House officials to "[c]heck to be sure he is all right on the Civil 
Rights question. I'll approve him if he is." 103 
Southern Democratic senators, however, also understood the 
significance of the lower federal courts-and pushed for segregationists. 104 
Victor Navasky writes that "the hard-core Southern Senators" emphasized 
Skelly Wrights slip through.' "105"the importance of 'not letting any more 
These divergent preferences set the stage for some challenging 
judicial selection battles. Eisenhower officials had an important tactical 
advantage because they were part of a Republican administration: The 
Justice Department was not expected to defer completely to the rec-
ommendations of the uniformly Democratic southern senators. 106 But that 
does not mean it was easy for the Eisenhower Administration to place 
integrationists on the bench. 107 For example, Eisenhower officials gave the 
100. See id. at 129-30; Richard L. Pacelle, Jr., Between Law and Politics: The Solicitor 
General and the Structuring of Race, Gender, and Reproductive Rights Litigation 74-75 
(2003). 
101. See Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White 
House 928-29 (1965). As a candidate, Kennedy did not support civil rights 
wholeheartedly-in part because he worried about losing southern white Democratic votes. 
See Steven Levingston, Kennedy and King: The President, the Pastor, and the Battle over 
Civil Rights 99 (2017) (recounting that then-campaign manager Robert Kennedy was 
concerned that an emphasis on civil rights would hurt Kennedy's support among southern 
whites). 
102. See Navasky, supra note 71, at 254 (urging that, had the matter been up to the 
Kennedys, "undoubtedly no segregationists would have been appointed to the Southern 
bench"). 
103. Goldman, Picking Federal Judges, supra note 89, at 170-71 ("President Johnson, 
starting in mid-1966, insisted on knowing the civil rights view of candidates for the 
judiciary."). 
104. See Navasky, supra note 71, at 253-54, 258; Donald E. Campbell & Marcus E. 
Hendershot, Show Me the Money: An Empirical Analysis of Interest Group Opposition to 
Federal Courts of Appeals Nominees, 28 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 71, 81 (2018) (arguing that 
"Southern senators ... were determined to keep control of the judges charged with 
enforcing" Brown). 
105. Navasky, supra note 71, at 254, 258. 
106. See Vines, supra note 68, at 351 (finding that Eisenhower could appoint judges in 
the South with "relative freedom" because he was not "restricted by senatorial courtesy"). 
Eisenhower appointed several prominent supporters of integration, including Fifth Circuit 
Judges John Minor Wisdom, Elbert Tuttle, and John Brown, and Alabama district court 
Judge Frank Johnson, Jr. See Bass, supra note 71, at 19, 23-32, 245. 
107. See Goldman, Picking Federal Judges, supra note 89, at 130-31 (recalling 
Eisenhower's efforts to reassure a southern Democratic ally that past support for segregation 
would not automatically disqualify candidates for appointment to the federal bench); 
Peltason, supra note 54, at 5-6 (" [E]ven Eisenhower had to do business with the southern 
Democrats .... "). 
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green light to Mississippi Senator James Eastland's suggestion of Ben 
Cameron for the Fifth Circuit, and he turned out to be a strong opponent 
of Brown.108 And Democratic senators confirmed some integrationists-
such as Judge Wisdom in 1957-largely because their attitudes toward 
Brown were uncertain. 109 
The Kennedy and Johnson Administrations also struggled with lower 
federal court appointments. These Democratic Presidents felt considera-
ble pressure to defer to the preferences of home-state Democratic 
senators, and thus-much to the chagrin of civil rights leaders-put some 
segregationists on the federal bench.11 0 Kennedy, for example, went along 
with Senator Eastland's insistence on District Judge W. Harold Cox, who 
developed an "unmatched record" of "obstruct[ing] civil rights progress 
in Mississippi.""' And when there was an opening on the Fifth Circuit, 
Kennedy was strongly encouraged by progressives to nominate Judge 
Wright in recognition of his brave work implementing Brown in New 
Orleans.112 But Louisiana Senator Russell Long vetoed that option. 113 
Kennedy instead nominated Judge Wright to the Court of Appeals for the 
D.C. Circuit (a court without a home-state senator).114 Meanwhile, south-
ern Democrats carefully scrutinized Kennedy's nominee to replace Judge 
Wright in New Orleans: Frank Ellis.11 5 At a subcommittee hearing, Senator 
Eastland pointedly asked, "Now, if we approve you, you are not going to 
be another Skelly Wright, are you?"" 6 
108. Navasky, supra note 71, at 265-66. Apparently, Senator Eastland had more 
information about Cameron's views on civil rights. See Bass, supra note 71, at 84-86. 
109. See Peltason, supra note 54, at 27-28. 
110. See Goldman, Picking Federal Judges, supra note 89, at 166-72, 171 n.v (noting 
that Johnson nominated an individual who "had signed the Southern Manifesto" and that 
Kennedy too "appointed segregationist judges"); Navasky, supra note 71, at 243-76 
(detailing and criticizing Kennedy's record); Claude Sitton, Robert Kennedy Backs Naming 
of Segregationists to the Bench, N.Y. Times, Apr. 27, 1963, at 9, https://nyti.ms/383EaES 
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting the "growing criticism from civil rights 
advocates" of certain Kennedy appointees). 
111. Bass, supra note 71, at 164-66. Kennedy officials later explained that Cox "was not 
associated with . . . [specified] racist groups, and there was no public record of racist 
speeches or activity." Goldman, Picking Federal Judges, supra note 89, at 167; see also 
Navasky, supra note 71, at 250 (stating that Eastland likely told Cox not tojoin openly racist 
groups). 
112. See Navasky, supra note 71, at 272-73. 
113. See id. at 273. 
114. See id. 
115. See id. at 275-76 (documenting Judge Ellis's confirmation process). 
116. Nomination of Frank B. Ellis to Be United States District Judge for the Eastern 
District of Louisiana: Hearing Before Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th 
Cong. 1, 7 (1962) (statement of Sen. Eastland). Judge Ellis was later confirmed and 
proceeded to largely undo Judge Wright's desegregation order for New Orleans. A Fifth 
Circuit panel (consisting of Judges John Minor Wisdom, Richard Rives, and John Robert 
Brown) later reversed. See United Press Int'l, Federal Court Spurs Integration of New 
Orleans Public Schools, N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1962, at 1, 18, https://nyti.ms/3afXr8U (on file 
with the Columbia Law Review). 
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The post-Brown IIlower court selection process contains the seeds of 
our modern-day era. To be sure, Presidents and senators focused on 
ideology only with respect to civil rights. Otherwise, judicial selection 
continued to be a patronage opportunity.1 1 7 But as to this crucial issue, 
both sides-southern Democratic senators and pro-civil-rights presidential 
administrations-were determined to put individuals with the "correct 
views" on the lower federal courts. As a result, only those whose views on 
desegregation were largely unknown seemed likely to receive a judicial 
nomination. 118 As Peltason put it during this era: "Since 1954 any extreme 
public position, even one for segregation, lowers a man's chances of being 
elevated to the federal bench to near zero."19 
B. The Impact of the Undue Burden Standard 
1. Background: Roe's Trimester Framework and the PoliticalResponse. -
The Supreme Court's journey with respect to the right to terminate a 
pregnancy differs in an important respect from the school desegregation 
cases. When the issue came upon the federal judicial scene in Roe v. 
Wade,120 abortion was not yet an issue of national political prominence. 121 
And Justice Blackmun's majority opinion famously provided a broad, rule-
like doctrine: the trimester framework.122 
Although some commentators criticized Roe for its prophylactic 
character, many women's-rights advocates praised the Court's decision to 
paint with a broad brush. 123 In 1973, some abortion-rights supporters 
emphasized the contrast with the "all deliberate speed" formula, stating 
that Roe "should be more immediately enforceable than the Brown 
117. See Goldman, Picking FederalJudges, supra note 89, at 172 ("With the exception 
of civil rights, neither Kennedy norJohnson appeared to view the courts as vehicles of public 
policy relevant to their agendas. It is therefore not surprising to find that the policy agenda 
played a relatively minor role in judicial selection."); Steigerwalt, supra note 29, at 3 (noting 
that "[l]ower federal court nominations were traditionally patronage [] ... opportunities" 
until the latter part of the twentieth century). 
118. See Peltason, supra note 54, at 6-7; see also Goldman, Picking Federal Judges, 
supra note 89, at 129, 167 (observing that presidential administrations tended to veto 
individuals who had made publicly racist statements or joined pro-segregation 
organizations). 
119. Peltason, supra note 54, at 7. 
120. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
121. See Eva R. Rubin, Abortion, Politics and the Courts: Roe v. Wade and Its Aftermath 
94 (1987) (asserting that, until 1976, "abortion had been a negligible issue in national 
politics"); Neal Devins, Rethinking Judicial Minimalism: Abortion Politics, Party 
Polarization, and the Consequences of Returning the Constitution to Elected Government, 
69 Vand. L. Rev. 935, 948-49 (2016). 
122. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65 (establishing a framework under which virtually all 
regulation was invalid in the first trimester; restrictions were permitted to preserve maternal 
health in the second trimester; and abortion could be restricted or banned in the third 
trimester if there was an exception to protect maternal life and health). 
123. See Rubin, supra note 121, at 63-64. 
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decision was for racial desegregation."" The majority in Roe went "out of 
its way to spell out the ground rules very clearly."1 25 
In the wake of Roe v. Wade, however, the issue of abortion became one 
of intense national importance. 126 The pro-life movement (which was only 
nascent prior to Roe) became a powerful force in national politics, andjust 
eight years after Roe, helped propel Ronald Reagan to the presidency.127 
Reagan and his successor, George H.W. Bush, promised to nominate 
judges "who respect[] ... the sanctity of innocent life." 128 
2. The Creation of the Undue Burden Standard.- With the growth of the 
pro-life movement, there was a push for another broad, rule-like approach 
to abortion: a decision that would reverse Roe v. Wade and return the issue 
to the legislatures of the fifty states. And when the Supreme Court heard 
PlannedParenthoodv. Casey, many onlookers believed that the Court would 
do precisely that; after all, Reagan and Bush had placed five Justices on the 
29high bench. 1 
As it turns out, the Justices did come close to overruling Roe. Chief 
Justice Rehnquist drafted an "Opinion of the Court" that would have 
subjected abortion regulations to rational basis review.130 But late in the 
124. Janice Goodman, Rhonda Copelon Schoenbrod & Nancy Stearns, Doe and Roe: 
Where Do We Go from Here?, 1 Women's Rts. L. Rep. 20, 27, 29 (1973) (footnote omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (first quoting Janice Goodman; then quoting Rhonda 
Copelon Schoenbrod); see also Rubin, supra note 121, at 63-64. 
125. Goodman et al., supra note 124, at 27 (quotingJanice Goodman). 
126. See Rubin, supra note 121, at 89-113 (recounting how Roe became a subject of 
national controversy); Laurence H. Tribe, Abortion: The Clash of Absolutes 16-21, 143-47 
(1990) [hereinafter Tribe, Clash] (urging that Roe helped "galvanize a right-to-life 
movement"); Ben Depoorter, The Upside of Losing, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 817,851-52 (2013). 
For a forceful argument that Roe was only one of several factors that led to the political 
escalation over abortion, see Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Before Roe v. Wade: Voices 
that Shaped the Abortion Debate Before the Supreme Court's Ruling 256-59 (2010). 
127. See Tribe, Clash, supra note 126, at 16-17. 
128. Scherer, supra note 29, at 57-58 (internal quotation marks omitted) (first quoting 
1980 Republican Party Platform, in 2 The Encyclopedia of the Republican Party 660, 688 
(George Thomas Kuran & Jeffrey D. Schultz eds., 1997); then quoting 1988 Republican 
Party Platform, in 2 The Encyclopedia of the Republican Party, supra, at 741, 755). 
129. See Linda Greenhouse, Becoming Justice Blackmun: Harry Blackmun's Supreme 
Court Journey 197-200 (2005) (arguing that, "[w] ith the new makeup of the Court"-the 
replacement of Justices Brennan and Marshall with Souter and Thomas-"Roe had never 
looked so imperiled"); Mary Ziegler, Abortion and the Law in America: Roe v. Wade to the 
Present 94 (2020) ("After Anthony Kennedy took a seat on the Court, it seemed that the 
justices would overrule Roe."); Sullivan, Justices, supra note 1, at 24 (noting that many 
observers expected the Court to "gut the abortion right"). 
130. See Greenhouse, supra note 129, at 203 (describing the otherJustices' reactions to 
Justice Rehnquist's twenty-seven-page draft); Kathryn A. Watts, Judges and Their Papers, 88 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1665, 1698 (2013) (recounting that Justice Blackmun "was convinced that 
Roe was doomed when a court majority led by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist appeared 
ready to effectively overrule Roe" (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Fred 
Barbash, Blackmun's Papers Shed Light into Court: Justice's Trove Opened by Library of 
Congress, Wash. Post, Mar. 5, 2004, at Al-A12 (on file with the ColumbiaLaw Review))). 
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deliberations, Justice Kennedy (who had sided with the Chief Justice at 
conference) switched his vote. 131 Kennedy then, along with Justices 
O'Connor and Souter, authored a joint opinion, which purported to 
reaffirm Roe-with some important modifications. 
The Casey joint opinion makes clear that the Justices declined to 
overrule Roe v. Wade in large part out of concern for the Supreme Court's 
sociological legitimacy. 132 The Justices recognized that there was a 
powerful pro-life movement urging the rejection of Roe. 133 But they 
insisted: "[T] o overrule under fire" would "subvert the Court's legitimacy 
beyond any serious question" because it would seem that the Court had 
"surrender[ed] to political pressure." 134 Accordingly, the Court had to 
stand firm: 
[P]ressure to overrule the [Roe v. Wade] decision, like pressure 
to retain it, has grown only more intense. A decision to overrule 
Roe's essential holding under the existing circumstances would 
address error, if error there was, at the cost of both profound and 
unnecessary damage to the Court's legitimacy, and to the 
Nation's commitment to the rule of law. 135 
As the ACLU attorneys in Casey later observed, "pro-choice 
mobilization may have .. . impacted the Court's decision to spare Roe." 136 
In the months leading up to Casey, advocates had warned that a reversal of 
Roe would harm the Court's external legitimacy-by suggesting that the 
131. See Greenhouse, supra note 129, at 203-05 (noting that, "suddenly, everything 
changed," but not speculating as to why Justice Kennedy switched his vote); see also Jeffrey 
Toobin, The Nine: Inside the Secret World of the Supreme Court 52-53 (2007) (discussing 
Kennedy's "dramatic switch"). 
132. Many scholars have commented on this aspect of the decision. See, e.g., Or Bassok, 
The Supreme Court's New Source of Legitimacy, 16 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 153, 186 (2013) 
(finding that Casey "included an explicit and rare admission that public opinion ... as well 
as public confidence in the Court affected the decision"); Barry Friedman, The Importance 
of Being Positive: The Nature and Function ofJudicial Review, 72 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1257, 1302 
(2004) (" [I]t seems hard to gainsay that the [Casey] plurality understood that the eyes of 
the public were on them, and that they acted accordingly."); Hellman, supra note 25, at 
1117 ("Recognizing a level of public distrust about the principled character of Supreme 
Court opinions, the plurality [in Casey] argues that the Court must attend to its appearance 
in order to preserve its ability to be effective."). 
133. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869 (1992) (plurality 
opinion) (O'Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.) ("Whether or not a new social consensus is 
developing on that issue [of personal choice to undergo abortion], its divisiveness is no less 
today than in 1973, and pressure to overrule the decision, like pressure to retain it, has 
grown only more intense."). 
134. Id. at 866-67. 
135. Id. at 869. 
136. Linda J. Wharton & Kathryn Kolbert, Preserving Roe v. Wade ... When You Win 
Only Half the Loaf, 24 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 143, 154 (2013). Pro-choice advocates apparently 
took the issue to the Court in 1992 so that, if the Court were to overrule Roe v. Wade, it would 
do so in an election year. See Greenhouse, supra note 129, at 201. 
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Justices "would allow their political views to dictate the outcome of their 
decisions."137 
Yet the Justices also did not reaffirm Roe in full. Importantly, the joint 
opinion dispensed with what it described as "the rigid trimester framework 
of Roe v. Wade" and substituted a new test: the undue burden standard. 13 
State regulations of abortion prior to viability would be permissible, as long 
as they did not impose an "undue burden" on the right to terminate a 
139 pregnancy. 
It is curious-particularly after the joint opinion's emphasis on stare 
decisis 1 40-that the joint opinion dispensed with the trimester framework. 
Although theJustices likely crafted the undue burden standard for various 
reasons,"4 some commentators suggest that one central concern was the 
Court's sociological legitimacy.14 2 Robert Post and Reva Siegel, for 
example, view the undue burden test as an effort "to respond to both sides 
of the abortion dispute by fashioning a constitutional law in which each 
side can find recognition." 143 The flexible undue burden standard would 
be more acceptable because it would better balance the concerns of the 
pro-life and pro-choice communities. 144 Under this view, Casey turns out to 
be a "Janus-faced holding": While the joint opinion insisted in its stare 
decisis discussion "on the independence of law"-and thus refused to 
137. Wharton & Kolbert, supra note 136, at 154. 
138. Casey, 505 U.S. at 878. 
139. See id. at 874-78; see also Melissa Murray, The Symbiosis of Abortion and 
Precedent, 134 Harv. L. Rev. 308, 315 (2020) ("Casey's fidelity to Roe was selective .... "). 
140. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 854-69. 
141. The authors of the joint opinion had a general (albeit not universal) preference 
for standards over rules. See Sullivan, Justices, supra note 1, at 90-91. But see New York v. 
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 176 (1992) (showing that all three Justices favored a rule 
prohibiting Congress from "commandeer[ing]" state legislatures). Justice O'Connor had 
suggested an "undue burden" standard in previous cases. But the test in Casey differed in 
important respects from O'Connor's earlier formulation. See Gillian E. Metzger, Note, 
Unburdening the Undue Burden Standard: Orienting Casey in Constitutional 
Jurisprudence, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 2025, 2036 (1994) (noting the differences). 
142. See Louis D. Bilionis, The New Scrutiny, 51 Emory L.J. 481, 532-33 (2002) (arguing 
that, to protect "the nation's confidence in itsjudiciary," the "center of the Court" opted to 
"affirm[] ... a woman's right to choose" but also "walk[] away from the ... trimester 
framework" and "substitute ... the undue burden standard"); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, 
Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 373, 427-
30 (2007) [hereinafter Post & Siegel, Roe Rage] (urging that Casey "subjects law to 
democratic pressure by dismantling the trimester system of Roe"); see also Neil S. Siegel, 
The Virtue of Judicial Statesmanship, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 959, 976, 1028-29 (2008) (arguing 
that the "'undue-burden standard' ... reflected the plurality's belief that Roe did not 
sufficiently validate" anti-abortion concerns). 
143. Post & Siegel, Roe Rage, supra note 142, at 429. 
144. This reading finds support in the joint opinion, which asserted that the new test 
better "reconcil[ed] the State's interest [in protecting potential life] with the woman's 
constitutionally protected liberty." Casey, 505 U.S. at 874, 876. 
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overrule Roe "under fire"-it also "subject[ed] law to democratic pressure 
by dismantling the trimester system of Roe."145 
3. Casey and the Lower CourtSelection Process. - The Supreme Court in 
Casey not only failed to provide the legal change sought by pro-life 
advocates but also declined to retain the broad, rule-like formula of Roe. 
For that reason, Casey had an important but seemingly unanticipated 
impact: It granted considerable discretion to the inferior federal courts to 
determine what qualified as an "undue burden" on the right to terminate 
a pregnancy-and thereby put tremendous pressure on the lower court 
selection process. 
Notably, Casey came upon the legal scene at a time when Presidents, 
senators, and interest groups were already beginning to focus more on 
lower court selection. As discussed, through the 1950s and 1960s, outside 
the context of civil rights, such appointments remained largely an 
opportunity for political patronage. 146 The Reagan Administration, 
however, started a new trend.147 Beginning in 1980, Reagan emphasized 
judicial ideology across several issue areas-including abortion, school 
prayer, and the use of busing to desegregate schools-and at all levels of 
the federaljudiciary. 148 Both Reagan and his successor, George H.W. Bush, 
promised "the appointment of judges at all levels of the judiciary who 
respect traditional family values and the sanctity of innocent life."1 4 9 
By the end of Reagan's first term, progressive interest groups were 
paying more attention to lower court selection-and pushing like-minded 
senators to oppose some nominees. 150 Senators began using procedural 
tools, such as the blue slip, informal holds, and even the filibuster, to 
block-or at a minimum delay-certain nominations. 151 Senator Ted 
Kennedy, for example, sought to filibuster J. Harvie Wilkinson's 
nomination to the Fourth Circuit, calling him "the least qualified nominee 
145. Post & Siegel, Roe Rage, supra note 142, at 429-30; see also id. at 430 ("Casey 
illustrates how a constitutional decision can be politically responsive at the same time as it 
affirms a commitment to the law/politics distinction."). 
146. See supra section II.A.3. 
147. The Carter Administration inadvertently paved the way for this trend. President 
Carter sought to replace the patronage system with a merit-based system that would enable 
more women and minorities to join the federal bench. But in so doing, Carter centralized 
judicial selection in the White House. See Goldman, Picking FederalJudges, supra note 89, 
at 11 n.i, 360. 
148. See id. at 2; Scherer, supra note 29, at 161. 
149. Scherer, supra note 29, at 160-61 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting 1980 Republican Party Platform, in 2 The Encyclopedia of the 
Republican Party, supra note 128, at 660, 688). 
150. See Steigerwalt, supra note 29, at 11 (finding that, "[a]fter witnessing the 
presidential shift from patronage to political appointments" under Reagan, progressive 
activists "transferred their attention to lower court confirmations" and formed judicial 
watchdog groups"). 
151. See Binder & Maltzman, Advice, supra note 31, at 56. 
1580 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 121:5 
ever submitted for an appellate court vacancy." 15  Although most 
nominees were still confirmed, the temperature of the process was clearly 
rising.153 
The Supreme Court's decision in Casey added fuel to this growing fire. 
As many scholars have recognized, inferior federal courts applied the 
undue burden standard in markedly different-and often ideologically 
5 4 predictable-ways. 1 Although some studies suggest that, prior to 1990, 
there was little difference in the way that Democratic-and Republican-
appointed jurists approached abortion cases, 155 scholars have observed 
"powerful evidence of ideological voting" in abortion cases beginning in 
the 1990s.156 Political scientist Nancy Scherer found that, between 1994 
and 2001, a Democratic-appointed lower court judge was more likely to 
strike down an abortion restriction "by 44 percentage points compared 
with a Republican-appointed judge. "157 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court's "undue burden" test raised the 
stakes for lower court appointments. 158 As Scherer recounts, prominent 
152. 130 Cong. Rec. 21,590 (1984) (statement of Sen. Kennedy); see also Scherer, supra 
note 29, at 148 (noting that the Wilkinson nomination was the first "use of the filibuster to 
keep lower court judges off the bench on ideological grounds"). 
153. The overall confirmation rate was still high. See Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, 
Advice and Consent: The Politics of Judicial Appointments 75-76 (2005) (finding that 
"[t]he vast majority (about four out of every five)" of federal judicial nominees are "rather 
handily confirmed"). But there were more battles and delays. See Scherer, supra note 29, at 
2-3, 136 (finding that "the percentage ... not confirmed" "increased dramatically ... in the 
George H.W. Bush administration" and that the average days between nomination and 
confirmation increased tenfold from around thirty during the Carter Administration to over 
300 during the Clinton and George W. Bush Administrations). 
154. See Karen A. Jordan, The Emerging Use of a Balancing Approach in Casey'sUndue 
Burden Analysis, 18 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 657, 660 (2015) (describing the lower courts' 
"variable and difficult to reconcile results"); see also Linda J. Wharton, Susan Frietsche & 
Kathryn Kolbert, Preserving the Core of Roe: Reflections on PlannedParenthoodv. Casey, 18 
Yale J.L. & Feminism 317, 353, 355-56 (2006) (finding "mixed results" in lower court 
challenges to abortion restrictions). 
155. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade, Lisa M. Ellman & Andres Sawicki, Are 
Judges Political? An Empirical Analysis of the FederalJudiciary 92-93 (2006) ("It is striking 
to see that between 1971 and 1990 there are no party effects [in abortion cases]: Democratic 
appointees cast a pro-choice vote 62 percent of the time, and Republican appointees do so 
58 percent of the time."). 
156. Id. at 93; see also Scherer, supra note 29, at 41 (finding that Democratic-appointed 
judges are "less likely to vote to uphold an abortion restriction by 44 percentage points 
compared with a Republican-appointed judge"); Adam M. Samaha & Roy Germano, Are 
Commercial Speech Cases Ideological? An Empirical Inquiry, 25 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 
827, 830, 842, 861 (2017) [hereinafter Samaha & Germano, Commercial Speech] (finding, 
from 2008 to 2016, "a significant degree ofjudicial disagreement over abortion policy," with 
"[g]aps of more than twenty-five percent"). 
157. Scherer, supra note 29, at 41. 
158. See id. at 19-20 (finding increased attention to lower court decisions among pro-
choice activists after Casey); Devins, supra note 121, at 989 (" [F]ederal courts of appeal have 
divided over the . . . undue burden standard . . .. [I] t is little wonder that partisans on the 
Senate Judiciary Committee now fight tooth and nail over ... nominations...."). 
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interest groups recognized that, after Casey, "all important legal issues in 
the pro-choice/pro-life debate are being decided" by the inferior federal 
judiciary.159 Some pro-choice groups thus scrutinized every lower court 
nominee-and castigated President Clinton in the 1990s when he 
considered placing a pro-life individual on the federal district court 
bench.160 A legal director of NARAL Pro-Choice America, an advocacy and 
lobbying organization, put the point candidly: 
There's a real recognition that the lower court judges hold vast 
power over women's reproductive lives .... Casey, in 1992 ... 
empowered lower court judges because it established an undue 
burden standard ... which is obviously a mushier standard [than 
the test in Roe], and more fact dependent and subject to the 
interpretations of district and court of appeals judges.161 
Put another way, "because of the dearth of explicit directions ... from the 
Supreme Court," the lower courts are "forced into a policy-making 
position" on the scope of the right to terminate a pregnancy.16 2 
III. TRADEOFFS WITHIN THEJUDICIAL HIERARCHY 
Brown II and Casey vividly illustrate the conundrum faced by the 
federal judiciary in high-profile contexts. Although the Supreme Court 
could constrain lower court judges through broad, rule-like precedents, 163 
the Justices may be reluctant to do so in salient areas. They may instead 
craft more open-ended tests, leaving the details to be ironed out by the 
inferior federal judiciary. Presidents, senators, and interest groups then 
zero in on the composition of the lower courts-in ways that threaten the 
long-term legitimacy of the inferior federal bench. This Part argues that 
these legitimacy tradeoffs are a significant (albeit largely overlooked) 
feature of our federal judicial scheme. 
A. Can Supreme Court Precedent Constrain? 
At the outset, this Essay addresses a preliminary question: Could the 
Supreme Court constrain inferior federal judges in high-profile cases? As 
scholars have observed, the Justices can often more effectively oversee 
their judicial inferiors by articulating broad, rule-like doctrines.16 4 But this 
159. Scherer, supra note 29, at 19. 
160. See id. at 17, 63, 123 (" [L]iberal activists let [Clinton] ... know there would be no 
free rides when it comes to lifetime appointment to the bench."). 
161. Id. at 19-20 (quoting Interview by Nancy Scherer with Elizabeth Cavendish, former 
Legal Dir., NARAL Pro-Choice Am., in Washington, D.C. (July 10, 2002)). 
162. Wisdom, supra note 84, at 426-27. 
163. See infra section IIlA. 
164. See infra notes 170-176 and accompanying text; see also Andrew Coan, Rationing 
the Constitution: How Judicial Capacity Shapes Supreme Court Decision-Making 23-26 
(2019) ("Clear rules also promote uniformity among lower-court decisions, reducing the 
need for Supreme Court review to achieve this end."); Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural 
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Essay contends that such formalistic doctrines are particularly crucial in 
high-profile and contested areas. It is reasonable to assume that lower 
court judges, like people generally, often have strong views on salient 
issues, such as abortion, affirmative action, or gun rights. Accordingly, the 
Justices likely have greater need in these areas to rein in their judicial 
inferiors-and limit the impact of ideology in lower court decisionmaking. 
And the available evidence suggests that the Justices can do so: Given the 
norms of our judicial practice, lower federal courts will obey broad, rule-
like Supreme Court precedents, even in high-profile cases. 
1. The Legal Obligation and Norms of Constraint. - Legal scholars 
overwhelmingly agree that Article III creates a hierarchical judiciary,6 5 
such that the inferior federal courts are bound by the Supreme Court's 
articulation of federal law.166 But do inferior federal courts in fact aim to 
comply with the edicts of their judicial superiors? Existing research 
strongly indicates that the answer is yes. 
As political scientist John Kastellec has observed, empirical studies 
have repeatedly found "widespread compliance by lower courts" with 
67 Supreme Court precedents. 1 That research accords with the declarations 
Case for Vertical Maximalism, 95 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 3, 40-50 (2009) [hereinafter Grove, 
Vertical Maximalism] (arguing that, since the modern Court reviews only a fraction of lower 
court decisions, it can most effectively guide itsjudicial inferiors through broad precedents); 
Randy J. Kozel & Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Discretionary Dockets, 31 Const. Comment. 221, 
222-25 (2016) (urging that the Court could issue broad precedents in some contexts and 
supervise others on a case-by-case basis); cf. Maggie Gardner, Abstention at the Border, 105 
Va. L. Rev. 63, 90-93 (2019) (offering a thoughtful analysis of doctrinal design). 
165. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Some Opinions on the Opinion Clause, 82 Va. L. Rev. 
647, 668-69 & n.92 (1996); Amy Coney Barrett, The Supervisory Power of the Supreme 
Court, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 324, 362 (2006); James E. Pfander,Jurisdiction-Stripping and the 
Supreme Court's Power to Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1433, 1453 (2000). 
But see David E. Engdahl, What's in a Name? The Constitutionality of Multiple "Supreme" 
Courts, 66 Ind. L.J. 457, 503-04 (1991) (contending that the Constitution does not require 
a hierarchical judiciary). 
166. See Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Unitary Executive, Jurisdiction 
Stripping, and the Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist Response to Justice Scalia, 107 Colum. 
L. Rev. 1002, 1032-33 (2007); Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior 
Court Precedents?, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 817, 829 n.49, 832-34 (1994); Charles Fried, 
Impudence, 1992 Sup. Ct. Rev. 155, 189-90; Ryan C. Williams, Lower Court Originalism 
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y (forthcoming) (manuscript at 8), https://ssrn.com/abstract= 
3847891 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). But see Michael Stokes Paulsen, Accusing 
Justice: Some Variations on the Themes of Robert M. Cover's JusticeAccused, 7J.L. & Religion 
33, 82-88 (1989) (suggesting that lower courts can disregard "clearly erroneous" decisions); 
Richard M. Re, Precedent as Permission, 99 Tex. L. Rev. 907, 938 (2021) (arguing that 
purportedly mandatory aspects of stare decisis "do not constrain" to the extent that they are 
"merits-sensitive"). 
167. John P. Kastellec, The Judicial Hierarchy, Oxford Rsch. Encyc. of Pol. (Jan. 25, 
2017), https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/ 
acrefore-9780190228637-e-99 (on file with the ColumbiaLaw Review) (providing an overview 
of the literature). 
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of lower court judges themselves. 168 Federal judges have asserted that they 
have a "constitutional obligation" to "apply whatever decisions the 
69 [Supreme] Court issues." 1 
2. The Theory: The Constraining Impact of Rules. - Not all Supreme 
Court precedent constrains in the same way, however. Lower courts have 
far more discretion in applying legal doctrines that take the form of 
standards rather than rules.170 For that reason, some political scientists 
argue that the Justices should use rules, rather than standards, if they 
anticipate that lower court judges will be reluctant to carry out their 
71 superiors' commands. 1 
Legal scholars have also asserted that the Supreme Court can more 
effectively constrain its judicial inferiors through broad, rule-like 
72 1 73 doctrines, such as Miranda v. Arizona,1 one-person, one-vote, or the 
168. See Harry T. Edwards, Public Misperceptions Concerning the "Politics" ofJudging: 
Dispelling Some Myths About the D.C. Circuit, 56 U. Colo. L. Rev. 619, 622 (1985) (" [T]he 
lower courts ... are bound to follow Supreme Court rulings .... "); see also J. Woodford 
Howard, Courts of Appeals in the FederalJudicial System: A Study of the Second, Fifth, and 
District of Columbia Circuits 156 (1981) (finding, based on interviews, that judges "felt 
obliged to obey the Supreme Court"). 
169. Stephen Reinhardt, The Supreme Court, the Death Penalty, and the HarrisCase, 
102 Yale L.J. 205, 206 (1992). 
170. See Adrian Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty: An Institutional Theory of 
Legal Interpretation 68 (2006) ("Rules and standards allocate decisionmaking authority in 
different ways . . . between different levels of a hierarchical institution .... "); Scott Baker & 
Pauline T. Kim, A Dynamic Model of Doctrinal Choice, 4J. Legal Analysis 329, 333, 336-37 
(2012) (" [T]he more rule-like the doctrine, the more likely it is that the lower courts will 
follow the directive .... "); Jeffrey R. Lax, Political Constraints on Legal Doctrine: How 
Hierarchy Shapes the Law, 74J. Pol. 765, 766 (2012) (arguing that "a bright-line rule" is 
more likely to "prevent strategic non-compliance"); see also Richard M. Re, Narrowing 
Supreme Court Precedent from Below, 104 Geo. L.J. 921, 924-26 (2016) (discussing how 
"ambiguous Supreme Court precedents" offer lower courts "interpretive flexibility"). For a 
sample of the vast literature on rules and standards, see Frederick Schauer, Playing by the 
Rules: A Philosophical Examination of Rule-Based Decision-Making in Law and in Life 159 
(1991) (offering an in-depth comparison of rules and standards and emphasizing how rules 
can "operate as tools for the allocation of power" among individuals and institutions 
(emphasis omitted)); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 
Duke L.J. 557, 562-63, 601 (1992) (defining "[a] legal command ... to be rule-like to the 
extent that greater effort has been expended ex ante, rather than requiring such effort to be 
made ex post"). 
171. See Frank Cross, Tonja Jacobi & Emerson Tiller, A Positive Political Theory of 
Rules and Standards, 2012 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1, 26 ("[A] rule ... constrains lower courtjudges 
who hold antithetical policy preferences more than a standard would."); Lax, supra note 
170, at 772 (arguing that "[t]he greater the likelihood of conflict" between a higher court 
and a lower court, "the greater the desirability of the bright-line rule"). 
172. 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966) (holding that police must inform individuals of 
certain specified rights before beginning a custodial interrogation); see also Grove, Vertical 
Maximalism, supra note 164, at 55-56 (noting that Miranda "created a broad prophylactic 
rule" to protect the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination). 
173. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (establishing the one-person, one-
vote rule for legislative apportionment). 
1584 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 121:5 
tiers of scrutiny.174 Toby Heytens contends, for example, that the Supreme 
Court can use rules to ensure that its handiwork "can and will be faithfully 
implemented" by lower courtjudges.175 By contrast, "complicated or open-
ended standards increase the risk of good faith misunderstandings and 
create opportunities for disguising deliberate noncompliance." 176 
These assumptions presumably motivated then-NAACP attorney 
Thurgood Marshall to request a firm deadline for desegregation. Marshall 
anticipated that "the Negro in this country would be in a horrible shape" 
if the Court left the "enforcement of [Brown] ... to the judgment of the 
district court with practically no safeguards." 77 But despite this request, 
the Supreme Court articulated the "all deliberate speed" test. As Fifth 
Circuit Judge Wisdom commented (with some understatement), that test 
gave "the inferior federal courts . . . a greater latitude for action," and "[i]t 
has not worked out well." 178 
3. EmpiricalSupport. - Some empirical evidence supports the assump-
tion that broad, rule-like doctrines constrain inferior federal court judges 
to a greater degree than standards, even in high-profile contexts. Recall, 
for example, that scholars have found "no party effects" in abortion cases 
decided by the lower courts prior to 1990 but have uncovered "powerful 
174. See Tara Leigh Grove, Tiers of Scrutiny in a HierarchicalJudiciary, 14 Geo. J.L. & 
Pub. Pol'y 475, 476-77 (2016) (defending the tiers as a way to oversee lower courts); see also 
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-LiberalJudging: The Roles of Categorization and Balancing, 63 
U. Colo. L. Rev. 293, 295-96 (1992) ("[T]he Court has attempted to limit its own freedom 
to balance in many areas by employing fixed 'tiers' of review. The Court ties itself to the twin 
masts of 'strict scrutiny' and 'rationality review' precisely in order to resist the siren song of 
the sliding scale."). To be sure, the tiers of scrutiny do not always operate in a rule-like 
fashion. Intermediate scrutiny, after all, is a balancing test, and the Court has at times 
applied a weakened strict scrutiny standard or heightened rational basis review. See Suzanne 
B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. Cal. L. Rev. 481, 482 (2004); see also Adam 
Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the 
Federal Courts, 59 Vand. L. Rev. 793, 795-96 (2006) (asserting, based on an empirical study, 
that "strict scrutiny is survivable in fact"); infra notes 187, 194-196, and accompanying text 
(noting that the Court has applied a more relaxed "strict scrutiny" standard in the 
affirmative action context). But in many cases, the tiers of scrutiny provide lower courts with 
considerable guidance. Indeed, one of the most common criticisms of the tiers of scrutiny 
is that they are far too rigid. See Jud Mathews & Alec Stone Sweet, All Things in Proportion? 
American Rights Review and the Problem of Balancing, 60 Emory L.J. 797, 799-801 (2011) 
(commenting that the American system of tiered review "limits the flexibility of judges"); 
Jeffrey M. Shaman, Cracks in the Structure: The Coming Breakdown of the Levels of 
Scrutiny, 45 Ohio St. L.J. 161, 182 (1984) (arguing that the tiered system "always has been 
and always will be an overly rigid structure"); see also Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Law 
in an Age of Proportionality, 124 Yale L.J. 3094, 3097, 3152 (2015) (advocating "a fresh look 
at proportionality" and suggesting that "whether a classification violates equal protection 
should depend not on rigid ex ante categories"). To the extent the goal is to guide lower 
courts, that very rigidity is a virtue. 
175. Toby J. Heytens, Doctrine Formulation and Distrust, 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 2045, 
2046 (2008) (emphasis omitted). 
176. Id. at 2048. 
177. Brown IITranscript, supra note 48, at 400 (quoting Thurgood Marshall). 
178. Wisdom, supra note 84, at 420. 
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evidence of ideological voting" in abortion cases after that time.179 That is, 
since the 1990s, lower court judges appointed by either Republican or 
Democratic Presidents vote in distinct ways.180 There may be multiple rea-
sons for this difference, but one likely factor is the Supreme Court's shift 
from the rule-like trimester framework of Roe v. Wade to the undue burden 
standard of Casey.181 As political scientist Sheldon Goldman observed in 
1989, "The most anti-abortion Reagan [lower court] appointee [had to] 
follow Roe v. Wade until it [was] modified or overturned by the Supreme 
Court itself."182 
One can also see the constraining impact of broad, rule-like doctrines 
in administrative law (an area that, as discussed below,183 has grown in 
political salience). A recent study by Kent Barnett, Christina Boyd, and 
Christopher Walker looks at Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NaturalResources Defense 
Council, Inc., which directs lower courts to defer to a federal agency's 
1reasonable construction of an ambiguous federal statute. 8 4 The authors 
find that Chevron "powerfully, even if not fully, constrain[s] ideology in 
judicial decisionmaking. When applying Chevron, panels of all ideological 
stripes use the framework similarly and reveal modest ideological 
behavior. "185 This study supports Peter Strauss's earlier assessment hat 
Chevron "can be seen as a device for managing the courts of appeals that 
179. Sunstein et al., supra note 155, at 92-93. 
180. There are, of course, different measures ofjudicial "ideology." This discussion re-
lies on one common metric: the party of the nominating President. See Samaha & Germano, 
Commercial Speech, supra note 156, at 830 (noting that this is a "standard metric"). This 
metric seems most likely to impact the judicial selection process. 
181. One might assume that the difference relates to changes within the Republican 
and Democratic parties. Until the 1990s, there was no clear split between Democrats and 
Republicans on the abortion issue. See Devins, supra note 121, at 947-48, 966. But whatever 
the views of the party base, Presidents Reagan and George H.W. Bush consciously sought to 
nominate pro-life judges to the federal bench in the 1980s. See supra notes 128, 149, and 
accompanying text. Accordingly, one might have expected to see some ideological voting 
from those judges. The fact that ideological voting appears later suggests that the change 
relates to shifts in Supreme Court doctrine. 
182. Sheldon Goldman, Reagan'sJudicial Legacy: Completing the Puzzle and Summing 
Up, 72Judicature 318, 328 (1989) [hereinafter Goldman, Reagan] (footnote omitted). 
183. See infra section IV.A. 
184. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 
(1984); Kent Barnett, Christina L. Boyd & Christopher J. Walker, Administrative Law's 
Political Dynamics, 71 Vand. L. Rev. 1463, 1467-68 (2018) (examining 1,382 published 
opinions from 2003 through 2013). 
185. Barnett et al., supra note 184, at 1467-68. Earlier studies offered a more mixed 
assessment of the impact of Chevron (although it appears that those studies were less 
comprehensive than that of Barnett et al.). See Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller,Judicial 
Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of 
Appeals, 107 Yale L.J. 2155, 2166-67 (1998) (surveying the literature and noting that the 
first studies found significant constraint, while later studies found less). 
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can reduce (although not eliminate) the Supreme Court's need to police 
their decisions for accuracy.116 
By contrast, empirical scholarship has found that lower court judges 
vote in more predictable "conservative" or "progressive" directions in 
certain high-profile contexts-involving affirmative action, 187 abortion 
(since the 1990s),188 and (increasingly) the Second Amendment.1 89 In 
each of these areas, the Supreme Court has articulated opaque doctrines 
that offer inferior federal courts considerable leeway. As we have seen, the 
undue burden test governs abortion cases.190 In the Second Amendment 
context, although the Court in 2008 and 2010 declared that the 
Constitution protects an individual's right to keep and bear arms,191 the 
Court has said very little about what that right means. The Justices have 
repeatedly denied certiorari in gun rights cases and have declined to 
92 articulate any tiers of scrutiny for Second Amendment claims. 1 As 
Seventh Circuit Judge Diane Sykes put it, the Supreme Court has not 
"give [n] us any doctrine about ... how to reconcile conflicts between 
186. Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the 
Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 
1093, 1121 (1987). 
187. See Sunstein et al., supra note 155, at 24-25 (finding "striking evidence of 
ideological voting" on affirmative action); Samaha & Germano, Commercial Speech, supra 
note 156, at 830, 842, 861 (finding "[g]aps of more than twenty-five percent" in judicial 
ideology scores for affirmative action cases from 2008 to 2016). 
188. See Epstein & Segal, supra note 153, at 128-29, 133 (finding that "Democrats are 
far more likely to cast pro-choice votes (70 percent) than Republicans (49 percent)"); 
Scherer, supra note 29, at 41 (finding that Democratic-appointed judges are "less likely to 
vote to uphold an abortion restriction by 44 percentage points compared with a Republican-
appointed judge"); Samaha & Germano, Commercial Speech, supra note 156, at 827, 830, 
842 (finding significant gaps in judicial ideology scores between 2008 and 2016). 
189. See Adam M. Samaha & Roy Germano, Judicial Ideology Emerges, At Last, in 
Second Amendment Cases, 13 Charleston L. Rev. 315, 319-20, 325-26, 341 (2018) 
[hereinafter Samaha & Germano, Judicial Ideology] ("[T]he party of the appointing 
president is now predictive of judge votes in civil gun rights cases."). In an earlier study 
(from 2008 to 2016), Adam Samaha and Roy Germano found no ideological divide; judges 
of all stripes tended to deny Second Amendment claims. See Samaha & Germano, 
Commercial Speech, supra note 156, at 860-61 (finding no statistical significance between 
the judicial ideology of judges on gun rights claims). But in an updated study, the authors 
found a difference-apparently because Democratic appointees over time became less likely 
to support gun rights claims. Samaha & Germano, Judicial Ideology, supra, at 319-20, 325-
26, 341. 
190. See supra section II.B.3; see also Erwin Chemerinsky & Michele Goodwin, 
Abortion: A Woman's Private Choice, 95 Tex. L. Rev. 1189, 1220 (2017) (observing that 
Casey "offers no guidance as to which laws are an undue burden and which are not"). 
191. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010) (ruling that the Second 
Amendment is applicable to states); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635-36 
(2008) (finding a right to possess a handgun in the home for purposes of self-defense). 
192. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628-29 (concluding that a prohibition on handguns in the 
home fails "[u]nder any of the standards of scrutiny"); infra note 211 and accompanying 
text (noting the certiorari denials); see also infra note 218 (noting a grant of certiorari in 
one recent case). 
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Second Amendment gun rights and the public's right to regulation of 
dangerous instrumentalities."193 
With respect to affirmative action, the Court has suggested that lower 
courts should apply a significantly more relaxed strict scrutiny standard 
than appears in other areas of constitutional law,194 allowing public univer-
sities to consider race as one factor in admissions, as long as they stay away 
from quotas or other sharp numerical measures. 19 5 As Adam Samaha and 
Roy Germano observe in an empirical study (which found ideological vot-
ing in lower court affirmative action cases), the uncertain "doctrinal 
messages" in the Supreme Court's affirmative action precedents "make 
room in law for disagreements in practice. "196 
4. The Potential Value of Constraint. - The available evidence thus 
suggests that the Justices could constrain theirjudicial inferiors by issuing 
broad, rule-like legal tests. Notably, the need for such doctrines is more 
pressing for the modern Supreme Court than it was in the past. In our 
modern judicial system, the Court has expansive discretionary certiorari 
jurisdiction and hears only a small fraction of federal question cases that 
arise in the lower federal courts. 197 Meanwhile, the lower courts have 
193. Diane Sykes, CircuitJudge, U.S. Ct. of Appeals for the Seventh Cir., Remarks at Public 
Understanding and Opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court, at 2:45:50-2:47:48 (Oct. 21, 2019), 
https://law-media.marquette.edu/Mediasite/Play/38960cec7b224ffebc49ad811eba83891d (on 
file with the ColumbiaLaw Review). 
194. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326-27 (2003) (noting that "[n]ot every 
decision influenced by race is equally objectionable, and strict scrutiny is designed to 
provide a framework for carefully examining the importance and the sincerity of the reasons 
advanced by the governmental decisionmaker"); see also Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 
631 F.3d 213, 247 (5th Cir. 2011) (Garza, J., concurring), vacated, 570 U.S. 297 (2013) 
(finding that Grutter"applied a level of scrutiny markedly less demanding" than traditional 
strict scrutiny); Suzanna Sherry, Foundational Facts and Doctrinal Change, 2011 U. Ill. L. 
Rev. 145, 166 (noting Grutter's"alteration of... strict scrutiny"). 
195. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (FisherI), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2214-15 (2016) 
(upholding a program that considered race as one factor); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 336-37, 343-
44 (same); see also Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 271-72, 275-76 (2003) (striking down 
an undergraduate program that "automatically distribute [d] 20 points to every single 
applicant from an 'underrepresented minority' group"). 
196. Samaha & Germano, Commercial Speech, supra note 156, at 846. 
197. See 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (2018) (granting the Supreme Court broad discretionary 
certiorari jurisdiction); see also John G. Roberts, Jr., 2019 Year-End Report on the Federal 
Judiciary 5-6 (2019), https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2019year-
endreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/8QMF-7DMF] (reporting that the Supreme Court 
decided sixty-nine cases in the 2018 term, while also noting that, between September 2018 
and September 2019, there were 48,486 filings in the lower federal courts of appeals, 
297,877 filings in the federal district courts, and 776,674 filings in bankruptcy courts). The 
Court would face capacity constraints, even if it reinvigorated an alternative process for 
review: certification by the lower federal courts. For a discussion of certification, see Amanda 
L. Tyler, Setting the Supreme Court's Agenda: Is There a Place for Certification?, 78 Geo. 
Wash. L. Rev. 1310, 1312, 1319-26 (2010) (suggesting that "the certification of issues by 
lower federal courts to the Supreme Court-a practice that dates back almost as far as the 
federal courts themselves, but one that is now largely a 'dead letter'-deserves a good 
dusting off' (footnote omitted) (quoting Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some 
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mandatoryjurisdiction; accordingly, they cannot decline to hear a case, no 
matter how controversial. 198 Thus, as Judge Sykes stated, those courts 
cannot "duck the hard Second Amendment case .... We need to decide 
"t,,199
it."" 
In this environment, the Supreme Court cannot oversee the inferior 
federaljudiciary simply by correcting errors in specific cases.200 The Court 
must articulate doctrines that will help guide the lower courts in the many 
cases that the high Court cannot review. This Essay assumes that, in some 
contexts, the Justices may provide sufficient guidance to their judicial 
inferiors through open-ended standards. But in high-profile and contested 
areas-such as abortion, affirmative action, and gun rights-the Justices 
have good reason to use more rule-like doctrines. Although lower federal 
court judges do not appear to be influenced by ideology with respect to 
many issues, we do see different voting patterns by Democratic and 
Republican appointees with respect to these salient issues.201 Accordingly, 
the Justices are well-advised to guide, and thereby constrain, their judicial 
inferiors in these contexts through broad, rule-like legal tests. 
Such an approach would serve a valuable function. There is a 
longstanding debate over whether judges are guided more by "law" or 
Reflections Seventy-Five Years After theJudges' Bill, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1643,1712 (2000))). 
An extended discussion of certification is beyond the scope of this Essay. But this Essay's 
analysis of legitimacy tradeoffs in the federal judiciary could provide an additional 
justification for allowing lower federal court judges to ask the Supreme Court to resolve 
issues of federal law. 
198. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (mandating review by courts of appeals). 
199. Sykes, supra note 193, at 2:46:24-2:46:35. 
200. By contrast, through much of the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court could 
often effectively supervise its judicial inferiors through case-by-case error correction. See 
Grove, Vertical Maximalism, supra note 164, at 45-57. Indeed, in the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries, the Court's rulings were not widely available, and so the Justices 
often could not guide the lower courts by establishing precedents. See id. at 4, 45-46, 59. 
201. See Epstein et al., supra note 11, at 168, 213-14, 237 (reporting that "ideological 
voting is less frequent" in the lower courts than in the Supreme Court); supra sections II.A.3, 
II.B.3, and III.A.3 (discussing the empirical research showing ideological voting in high-
profile areas). These differences may be exacerbated by geography. Lower federal judges 
must live in the district or circuit to which they were appointed. See 28 U.S.C. § 134(b) 
(stating that, with few exceptions, "[e]ach districtjudge ... shall reside in the district or one 
of the districts for which he is appointed"); id. § 44(c) ("Except in the District of Columbia, 
each circuit judge shall be a resident of the circuit for which appointed at the time of his 
appointment and thereafter while in active service."). To the extent that ideology is partly 
determined by geography ("red states" versus "blue states"), one might expect lower court 
judges from different parts of the country to vote differently. See Amanda Frost, Overvaluing 
Uniformity, 94 Va. L. Rev. 1567, 1590-91 (2008) (suggesting that lower federal judges may 
reflect the ideology of their respective regions). Regional differences certainly impacted the 
implementation of Brown I. See supra section II.A.1. Today, however, it may be that partisan 
affiliation matters far more than geographic region. Cf. Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan 
Federalism, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 1077, 1078-82 (2014) (arguing that partisanship is the 
dominant feature of federal-state disputes and stating that, "[i]nsofar as state identification 
is driven by partisanship, individuals may . .. affiliate with states they do not inhabit"). 
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"politics."202 This Essay assumes that judges may be influenced by both 
forces, particularly in salient cases. But as the preceding discussion 
suggests, lower court judges-regardless of their background ideological 
leanings-do follow the clear edicts of their judicial superiors. Accord-
ingly, the Supreme Court could significantly reduce the relevance of 
politics in lower court decisionmaking by articulating law in the form of 
broad, rule-like doctrines. Such constraint could, in turn, help contribute 
to the external legitimacy of the inferior federal bench. 
B. ProtectingSupreme Court Legitimacy 
Nevertheless, in certain high-profile contexts, the Supreme Court has 
issued opaque tests or denied certiorari entirely. To be sure, the Justices 
may decline review or opt for narrow or open-ended doctrines for any 
number of reasons, including the difficulty of reaching agreement on a 
multimember Court.203 But, as Brown II and Casey suggest, in high-profile 
and contested areas, the Justices may be hesitant to articulate a broad new 
doctrine out of concern for the Supreme Court's sociological legitimacy. 
The Justices opted for the "all deliberate speed" formula in large part to 
protect "the Court's prestige-its dignity interest in avoiding the issuance 
of futile orders." 204 And in Casey, the Justices sought to protect the Court's 
legitimacy by declining to overrule Roe v. Wade, while also "subject[ing] 
law to democratic pressure by dismantling the trimester system of Roe. "205 
A similar script has played out in the context of affirmative action. 
Commentators argue that, in 2003, at least some Justices voted to allow 
affirmative action on university campuses in order to preserve the Court's 
reputation with political and business elites. 206 Then,just one decade later, 
it looked as though a bare majority of the Court would invalidate an affirm-
ative action plan from the University of Texas-and thereby transform the 
202. For an overview of the debate, see Barry Friedman, The Politics ofJudicial Review, 
84 Tex. L. Rev. 257, 257-62, 264-70 (2005); see also Michael D. Gilbert, Does Law Matter? 
Theory and Evidence from Single-Subject Adjudication, 40J. Legal Stud. 333, 336-38, 354-
56 (2011) (discussing prior tests and offering a new one to analyze the relative impact of 
law). Meanwhile, it is widely assumed that judges should not decide cases based on their 
ideological preference for a specific result. See David E. Pozen & Adam M. Samaha, Anti-
Modalities, 119 Mich. L. Rev. 729, 746-50, 753-56 (2021). 
203. It may, for example, be hard to put together a majority for a broad rule. See Cass 
R. Sunstein, Beyond Judicial Minimalism, 43 Tulsa L. Rev. 825, 840 (2008). Moreover, some 
Justices may have a jurisprudential preference for narrow decisions or more standard-like 
solutions to legal problems. See Sullivan, justices, supra note 1, at 27, 95-96. 
204. Klarman, supra note 48, at 313-14. 
205. Post & Siegel, Roe Rage, supra note 142, at 429-30. 
206. See Devins & Baum, supra note 28, at 47-48 (noting the influence of elites, 
particularly businesses and the military, on the Court's affirmative action decisions); 
Toobin, supra note 131, at 211-14, 218-20 (suggesting that amicus briefs from retired 
military officers praising how affirmative action programs were used by West Point, 
Annapolis, and Colorado Springs influenced Justice O'Connor's vote). 
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Court's jurisprudence in that arena.207 Justice Kennedy drafted a majority 
opinion that would have done precisely that.208 But, according to Joan 
Biskupic, afterJustice Sotomayor penned a blistering draft dissent, Justice 
Kennedy pulled the draft opinion and assembled a different majority to 
send the case back to the court of appeals for a second look.209 A central 
concern, Biskupic writes, was "how Sotomayor's personal defense of 
affirmative action and indictment of the majority would ultimately play to 
the public." 210 
Legitimacy concerns also seem likely to weigh on the Justices as they 
consider the next steps with respect to the Second Amendment. The 
Justices remained silent on the issue for years, denying certiorari in every 
gun rights case until 2019, when they opted to review a somewhat obscure 
New York City regulation.21 1 While the case was pending, the New York 
state legislature passed a state law that preempted the city regulation, a fact 
that led the Court ultimately to dismiss the claim as moot.212 
But for present purposes, an important-and extraordinary-aspect 
of the case was a brief filed by several Democratic senators, which 
suggested that a decision in favor of the gun rights claim could 
compromise the Court's sociological legitimacy.213 The senators 
underscored that organizations like the National Rifle Association spent 
considerable sums to push for the confirmation of recent Supreme Court 
14 nominees Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh. 2 As a result, the senators 
charged, any decision in favor of gun rights would make the Court appear 
to be part of the pro-gun "political agenda. "215 The senators concluded 
with a not-so-subtle warning (which harkened back to recent calls for court 
207. See Joan Biskupic, Breaking In: The Rise of Sonia Sotomayor and the Politics of 
Justice 200-01 (2014) [hereinafter Biskupic, Breaking In] (recounting that, during the 
conference vote in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin (Fisher1), 570 U.S. 297 (2013), "it 
initially looked like a 5-3 lineup"). 
208. See id. at 206. 
209. See Fisherl, 570 U.S. at 314-15; Biskupic, Breaking In, supra note 207, at 201-02, 
205-10. 
210. Biskupic, Breaking In, supra note 207, at 206. 
211. See Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Will Review New York City Gun Law, N.Y. Times 
(Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/22/us/politics/supreme-court-guns-
nyc-license.html (on file with the ColumbiaLaw Review) (suggesting that the law was the only 
one preventing gun owners from carrying handguns to second homes or to out-of-city 
shooting ranges). 
212. The Court held that the plaintiffs' request for declaratory or injunctive relief was 
moot. See N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 140 S. Ct. 1525, 1526-27 
(2020) (per curiam). The Court remanded the case to give the plaintiffs an opportunity to 
seek leave to amend their complaint to add a damages claim. See id. 
213. See Brief of Senators Sheldon Whitehouse, Mazie Hirono, Richard Blumenthal, 
Richard Durbin, and Kirsten Gillibrand as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 9-18, 
N. Y State Rifle &Pistol Assn, 140 S. Ct. 1525 (No. 18-280), 2019 WL 3814388. 
214. See id. at 4-8 (discussing the advocacy for Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh). 
Justice Barrett had not at that time joined the Court. 
215. Id. at 3. 
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packing): "The Supreme Court is not well. And the people know it. 
Perhaps the Court can heal itself before the public demands it be 
'restructured in order to reduce the influence of politics.'"216 Whether or 
not the senators' brief influenced the Court's decision to dismiss the New 
York gun rights case, 21 7 history suggests that at least some Justices will be 
concerned about the external reaction to a future Second Amendment 
decision-particularly as gun violence becomes a matter of increasingly 
prominent public concern. 218 
216. Id. at 17. Senator Whitehouse later claimed that the brief did not say anything 
about court packing. Sheldon Whitehouse, The Supreme Court Has Become Just Another 
Arm of the GOP, Wash. Post (Sept. 6, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ 
the-supreme-court-has-become-just-another-arm-of-the-gop/2019/09/06/8ad36642-Oe2-
11e9-87fa-850la456c003_story.html (on file with the ColumbiaLaw Review). But many other 
commentators, including all fifty-three Republican senators who signed a letter in 
opposition to the amicus brief, interpreted the brief as a threat to pack the Court with 
additional members. See Letter from Fifty-Three United States Senators to Scott S. Harris, 
Clerk, Sup. Ct. of the U.S. (Aug. 29, 2019), https://senmcconnell.app.box.com/s/ 
nnes38e3zb8019nnlqrrhl2lnb5lar9x [https://perma.cc/TFR9-YR69] ("The implication is 
as plain as day: Dismiss this case, or we'll pack the Court."); see also Editorial Board, 
Senators File an Enemy-of-the-Court Brief, Wall St.J. (Aug. 15, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/senators-file-an-enemy-of-the-court-brief-11565911608 (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review) (asserting that, "[b]y 'restructured,' [Democrats] mean packed with new 
Justices"). 
217. Interestingly, in a November 2020 speech, Justice Alito discussed this episode and 
opined that the senators and other observers might view the Court's decision as capitulating 
to the senators' "warning." He stated: 
Five United States senators . . . wrote that the Supreme Court is a sick 
institution and that if the Court did not mend its ways, well, it might have 
to be, quote, "restructured." After receiving this warning, the Court did 
exactly what the City and the senators wanted. It held that the case was 
moot, and it said nothing about the Second Amendment .... I am not 
suggesting that the Court's decision was influenced by the senators' 
threat. But I am concerned that the outcome might be viewed that way by 
the senators and others with thoughts of bullying the Court .... 
Samuel Alito, Assoc. Just., Sup. Ct. of the U.S., Address at the Federalist Society Annual 
Lawyers' Convention, at 40:40-45:43 (Nov. 12, 2020), https://reason.com/volokh/2020/ 
11/12/video-and-transcript-of-justice-alitos-keynote-address-to-the-federalist-society 
[https://perma.cc/WN67-XQ5A] (video on file with the ColumbiaLaw Review). 
218. See Nate Cohn & Margot Sanger-Katz, On Guns, Public Opinion and Public Policy 
Often Diverge, N.Y. Times (Aug. 10, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/10/ 
upshot/gun-control-polling-policies.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting 
that public support for gun control has increased in the wake of recent shootings, but that 
it is also polarized, with Republicans showing greater support for gun rights). Just before 
this Essay went to press, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in a new Second Amendment 
case. See Adam Liptak, Supreme Court to Hear Case on Carrying Guns in Public, N.Y. Times 
(Apr. 26, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/26/us/supreme-court-gun.html (on
file with the Columbia Law Review). Notably, the Court narrowed the question on review. 
Although the petition asked the Court to consider generally whether the Second Amend-
ment protects a right to carry a handgun outside the home for self-defense, the Court opted 
to focus on the denial of the petitioners' licenses. Compare Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
at i, N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Corlett, No. 20-843 (U.S. filed Dec. 17, 2020), 2020 WL 
7647665 (defining the original question presented as "[w] hether the Second Amendment 
2
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The Justices' interest in the public reputation of the Court is under-
standable. (For now, this Essay brackets the question-discussed 
below2 T9-whether it is legally legitimate for the Justices to take such con-
cerns into account in deciding cases.) After all, the Supreme Court cannot 
function as an institution without some degree of sociological legiti-
macy.220 Accordingly, the Justices may often be tempted to issue narrow 
rulings or deny review in politically controversial cases. But commentators 
have overlooked the fact that, in the course of protecting the legitimacy of 
the Supreme Court, the Justices may put at risk the remainder of the 
federal bench. 
C. Overlooked Effects on the Lower Courts 
To underscore the stakes for the inferior federal judiciary, this section 
begins with additional background on the lower court selection process, 
which has become increasingly partisan and divisive in recent years. 1 This 
process is important for a few reasons. First, the contentious nature of the 
process illuminates the external reputation of the lower courts among 
elites: If political actors and interest groups assumed that Democratic-and 
Republican-appointed jurists would approach legal issues in the same way, 
it would be hard to understand the fuss over judicial selection. 
Accordingly, the process itself indicates that many elites view the inferior 
federaljudiciary in ideological terms. Second, and crucially, some research 
suggests that this divisive selection process could have a detrimental im-
pact on the long-term public reputation of the inferior federal judiciary.222 
To be sure, Supreme Court doctrine is not solely responsible for the 
contentiousness of the lower court selection process. There are several 
interrelated factors, including the polarization of the political parties and 
changes in Senate procedure. 223 But as the historical accounts of Brown H 
and Casey underscore, Supreme Court doctrine is an important-and 
often overlooked-part of the story. And this makes sense: When the 
Court issues opaque doctrines in high-profile and contested areas (such as 
abortion, affirmative action, or gun rights), that opens up space for lower 
court judges to vote in more ideologically predictable ways. Presidents, 
allows the government to prohibit ordinary law-abiding citizens from carrying handguns 
outside the home for self-defense"), with N.Y. State Rifle v. Corlett, No. 20-843, 2021 WL 
1602643, at *1 (Apr. 26, 2021) (noting that the grant of certiorari was "limited to the 
following question: Whether the State's denial of petitioner [s]' applications for concealed-
carry licenses for self-defense violated the Second Amendment"). One commentator 
suggests that the Court could issue "an extremely narrow, fact-bound decision." Aaron Tang 
(@AaronTangLaw), Twitter (Apr. 26, 2021), https://twitter.com/AaronTangLaw/status/ 
1386754841679073283 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
219. See infra section IV.B.1. 
220. See supra Part I. 
221. See infra section IIL C.1. 
222. See infra section III.C.2. 
223. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
2
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senators, and interest groups begin to recognize that "all important legal 
issues [in these salient areas] are being decided" by the inferior federal 
judiciary." Political actors and interest groups thus have a strong 
incentive to focus on the composition of the lower federal bench. 
1. Elite Attitudes Toward the Lower Federal Courts. - Although many 
commentators have recounted the contentious and partisan fights over 
Supreme Court nominees,22 5 there has been far less attention paid to the 
selection of inferior federal court judges. This Essay aims in part to intro-
duce readers to that history: As discussed, for many years, lower court 
appointments were patronage, not policymaking, opportunities. That be-
gan to change in the wake of Brown II, and even more so during the 
Reagan presidency. 226 But attacks on lower court nominees became far 
more common during the Clinton and George W. Bush Administra-
tions.  7 Starting in the late 1990s, Keith Whittington writes, "the odds of 
a circuit court nomination being confirmed" seemed "little better than a 
coin flip. "228 
Throughout this period, Presidents, senators, and interest groups 
increasingly sought to discern how a lower court nominee might vote in 
politically salient cases. As Ninth Circuit Judge Diarmuid O'Scannlain 
lamented in 2003, "The politics that has come to dominate today's 
nomination process is a politics that aims, before the fact, to ascertain how 
a given nominee will decide a particular case-or, to be more precise, a 
series of hot-button cases," such as those pertaining to abortion or 
affirmative action. 229 Fifth Circuit Judge Carolyn King made a similar 
observation in 2007, noting that both political actors and interest groups 
scrutinized a nominee's position on "politically salient issues including 
3 0abortion [and] civil rights." 2 
224. Scherer, supra note 29, at 19. 
225. There is an important literature on the Supreme Court confirmation process. For 
a small sample, see Stephen L. Carter, The Confirmation Mess: Cleaning Up the Federal 
Appointments Process 11-13 (1994) (comparing the contemporary model of the 
confirmation process with the intent of the Framers); Carl Hulse, Confirmation Bias: Inside 
Washington's War over the Supreme Court, from Scalia's Death to Justice Kavanaugh 17-
18 (2019) (describing the political strategy behind the delay to confirm the late Justice 
Scalia's seat); Laurence H. Tribe, God Save this Honorable Court: How the Choice of 
Supreme CourtJustices Shapes Our History 77-79 (1985) (arguing that the Senate fulfills 
its role in acting as a check on the President's power when rigorously scrutinizing Supreme 
Court nominees); Henry Paul Monaghan, The Confirmation Process: Law or Politics?, 101 
Harv. L. Rev. 1202, 1202-03 (1988) (claiming that the Senate's role in the confirmation 
process is largely political). 
226. See supra sections II.A.3, II.B.3. 
227. See Steigerwalt, supra note 29, at 3 (noting that "ideological tensions over the 
staffing of the federal bench had grown to a fever pitch" by this time). 
228. Whittington, Partisanship, supra note 31, at 525. 
229. Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain, Today's Senate Confirmation Battles and the Role of the 
Federal Judiciary, 27 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 169, 172, 174 (2003). 
230. Carolyn Dineen King, Lecture, Challenges to Judicial Independence and the Rule 
of Law: A Perspective from the Circuit Courts, 90 Marq. L. Rev. 765, 773 (2007) (expressing 
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The temperature rose further during the Obama Administration. 231 
After Republicans repeatedly blocked or delayed nominations (including 
those with support from a Republican home-state senator), the 
Democratic-controlled Senate in 2013 exercised the "nuclear option"-a 
procedural reform that dispensed with the filibuster for lower court 
selection and allowed judges to be confirmed by simple majority vote.232 
This rule change allowed President Obama to fill a number of vacancies 
(and far more quickly), while the President enjoyed a Senate controlled 
by the same political party.233 But confirmations slowed to a near standstill 
in 2015, when Republicans took over the Senate. 234Judicial confirmations 
did not pick up again until 2017, when President Trump came into office 
with a Republican-controlled Senate.235 Indeed, for the foreseeable future, 
we may have seen the end of bipartisan support for lower federal court 
nominees. 
Meanwhile, there has been an apparent rise in political rhetoric 
characterizing the inferior federal judiciary in partisan or ideological 
concern about "an ever increasing and contentious focus" on whether appellate court 
nominees "are committed ... to particular positions on . . . salient issues"). 
231. See Sarah Binder & Forrest Maltzman, New Wars of Advice and Consent: Judicial 
Selection in the Obama Years, 97Judicature 48, 48 (2013) [hereinafter Binder & Maltzman, 
New Wars] ("In many ways, advice and consent worsened over the Obama years .... "); see 
also Josh Chafetz, Unprecedented? Judicial Confirmation Battles and the Search for a 
Usable Past, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 96, 97-110 (2017) (describing the judicial selection battles). 
232. See 159 Cong. Rec. 17,825-26 (2013) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (noting the 
change); Binder & Maltzman, New Wars, supra note 231, at 48 (finding that during Obama's 
first term, "Senate Republicans launch [ed] filibusters against nominees who had the 
support of' home-state Republican lawmakers). 
233. See Christina L. Boyd, Michael S. Lynch & Anthony J. Madonna, Nuclear Fallout: 
Investigating the Effect of Senate Procedural Reform on Judicial Nominations, 13 Forum 
623, 635-37 (2015) (observing that the rate of confirmation increased from around sixty-
two percent to eighty percent). President Obama likely could have placed even more judges 
on the federal bench but for Democratic Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick 
Leahy's decision to honor all (or virtually all) blue slips from Republican senators. See 
Elliott Slotnick, Sara Schiavoni & Sheldon Goldman, Obama's Judicial Legacy: The Final 
Chapter, 5 J.L. & Cts. 363, 369-70, 373 (2017). 
234. See Whittington, Partisanship, supra note 31, at 532 ("When the Democrats lost 
the chamber . . , judicial confirmations largely ground to a halt."). 
235. See Kevin Freking, Trump Spotlights Confirmation of 150-Plus FederalJudges, AP 
News (Nov. 6, 2019), https://apnews.com/article/7dc948029a54dab94e4c986cfa01a3 
(on file with the Columbia Law Review); Carrie Johnson, Trump's Judicial Appointments 
Were Confirmed at Historic Pace in 2018, NPR (Jan. 2, 2019), https://www.npr.org/ 
2019/01/02/681208228/trumps-judicial-appointments-were-confirmed-at-historic-pace-in-
2018 [https://perma.cc/H5PJ-K69P] (finding that the Trump Administration has 
"exceed[ed] the pace of the last five presidents"). In April 2019, the Senate further 
streamlined the process by limiting debate on district court nominees. See Paul Kane, 
Republicans Change Senate Rules to Speed Nominations as Leaders Trade Charges of 
Hypocrisy, Wash. Post (April 3, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ 
republicans-change-senate-rules-to-speed-nominations-as-leaders-trade-charges-of-hypocrisy/ 
2019/04/03/86ec635a-5615-11e9-aa83-504f086bf5d6_story.html (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review) (noting the change from thirty hours of debate to two). 
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terms. President Trump, for example, in 2018 dismissed a lower court 
decision as the handiwork of an "Obama judge."236 When Chief Justice 
Roberts responded by insisting that "[w] e do not have Obama judges or 
Trump judges, Bush judges or Clinton judges,"237 President Trump shot 
back: "Sorry ChiefJustice John Roberts, but you do indeed have 'Obama 
judges' . . .. It would be great if the 9th Circuit was indeed an 
'independent judiciary."'
238 
Progressive elites, in turn, have sounded the alarm at what they 
describe as the Republicans' effort to "nominat[e] extremely conservative 
judges and confirm[] them at a breakneck speed."23 9 A May 2020 report 
prepared by Democratic Senators Debbie Stabenow, Chuck Schumer, and 
Sheldon Whitehouse declared that the judiciary is now "pack[ed] ... with 
far-right extremists," most of whom "were chosen not for their 
qualifications or experience-which are often lacking-but for their 
demonstrated allegiance to Republican Party political goals." 240 
2. Long-Term Effects on PublicReputation.- Elites, it seems, increasingly 
view the lower federal courts in ideological terms. But the question 
remains whether the contentiousness urrounding the inferior federal 
judiciary may also impact its long-term legitimacy with the broader public. 
Some federal judges have worried about such an impact. Over a decade 
ago, Fifth Circuit Judge King asserted that "[j]udicial independence is 
236. Adam Liptak, Trump Takes Aim at Appeals Court, Calling It a 'Disgrace', N.Y. Times 
(Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/20/us/politics/trump-appeals-court-
ninth-circuit.html (on file with the ColumbiaLaw Review). 
237. Sherman, supra note 20 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting ChiefJustice 
Roberts). 
238. Robert Barnes, Rebuking Trump's Criticism of 'Obama Judge,' Chief Justice 
Roberts Defends Judiciary as 'Independent', Wash. Post (Nov. 21, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/rebuking-trumps-criticism-of-obama-judge-
chief-justice-roberts-defends-judiciary-as-independent/2018/11/21/6383c7b2-edb7-1le8-
96d4-0d23f2aaad09_story.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (quoting President 
Trump). 
239. Trump Continues to Reshape Judiciary at Breakneck Speed, Am. Const. Soc'y: In 
Brief (Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.acslaw.org/inbrief/trump-continues-to-reshape-judiciary-
at-breakneck-speed [https://perma.cc/9UBY-7GGS]; see also Freking, supra note 235 (collect-
ing views of progressives). 
240. Debbie Stabenow, Chuck Schumer & Sheldon Whitehouse, Democratic Pol'y & 
Commc'ns Comm., Captured Courts: The GOP's Big Money Assault on the Constitution, 
Our Independent Judiciary, and the Rule of Law 3 (2020), 
https://www.democrats.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Courts%20Report%20-%2FINAL.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T73P-CFWY]; see also Freking, supra note 235 (noting that thejudiciary 
is now "packed with young judges whose views are far outside the mainstream" and that, 
"[i]nstead of serving as neutral arbiters, these judges will push a conservative agenda that 
will have lasting effects for generations"); Carl Hulse, Trump and Senate Republicans 
Celebrate Making the Courts More Conservative, N.Y. Times (Nov. 6, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/06/us/trump-senate-republicans-courts.html (on file 
with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting that Senator Schumer, D-NY, described Trump's 
nominees as "the most unqualified and radical nominees in my time in this body" (internal 
quotations marks omitted)). 
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undermined ... by the high degree of political partisanship and ideology 
that currently characterizes the process by which the President nominates 
and the Senate confirms federal judges."" Such a "highly partisan or 
ideological judicial selection process conveys the notion to the electorate 
that judges are simply another breed of political agents, that judicial 
decisions should be in accord with political ideology, all of which tends to 
undermine public confidence in the legitimacy of the courts." 242 
A 2006 survey by political scientists Sarah Binder and Forrest 
Maltzman provides some empirical support for this intuition.243 The 
authors found that lower court judges "who come to the bench via a 
contested nomination fare worse in the public's eye than do judges who 
sailed through to confirmation." 24 4 Although "strong partisans" were 
pleased when their own party's President selected a controversial nominee 
(that is, someone who was strongly contested by the opposing party), other 
members of the public tended to view the judge's decisions with more 
suspicion. 24 5 Binder and Maltzman warn: "[P] artisan differences over 
judicial nominees may be undermining the perceived legitimacy of the 
federaljudiciary-a worrisome development for an unelected branch in a 
system of representative government. "246 
Bert Huang offers another sobering account. In 2019, Huang 
examined public reactions to lower court decisions on the Deferred Action 
for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program.24 Multiple lower courts had 
held unlawful the Trump Administration's efforts to rescind Obama's 
248DACA program. But Huang found that, even when the lower courts 
ruled the same way, self-identified Republicans were more likely to trust 
4 9 the legal analysis of a Bush appointee than a Clinton appointee. 2 
3. Why Lower Court Sociological Legitimacy Matters. - The empirical 
studies of lower court sociological legitimacy are limited; as discussed, 
most scholars still focus on the Supreme Court.250 But the existing research 
supports the commonsense intuition that the contentiousness urround-
ing the inferior federal judiciary is not good for the long-term health of 
241. King, supra note 230, at 773. 
242. Id. at 782. 
243. See Binder & Maltzman, Advice, supra note 31, at 127-28. 
244. Id. at 128. 
245. Id. at 128, 138. The authors asked members of the public for their reaction to a 
judge's decision about a gun regulation. See id. at 138-40. 
246. Id. at 11. 
247. See Bert I. Huang, Judicial Credibility, 61 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1053, 1055 (2020). 
248. See id.; see also NAACP v. Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d 209, 215-16 (D.D.C. 2018); 
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 279 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1046 
(N.D. Cal. 2018). The Supreme Court later agreed that the rescission was invalid. See Dep't 
of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1916 (2020) (holding that 
the rescission was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act because 
DHS did not "provide a reasoned explanation for its action"). 
249. See Huang, supra note 247, at 1060, 1076. 
250. See supra Part I. 
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those courts. After all, the inferior federal judiciary-no less than the 
Supreme Court-can function effectively only if it enjoys external 
legitimacy. The lower federal courts also have no army; they must rely on 
other actors to enforce and obey their decrees. 251 Those external actors 
are more likely to comply if they view the lower federal courts as 
legitimate-that is, as institutions that do and should have the power to 
make authoritative decisions. 
Moreover, recall that "legitimacy is for [the] losers." 252 Lower court 
judges need the support of those who disagreewith a decision, so that those 
"losers" will obey the adverse ruling. Fifth Circuit Judge King was, at 
bottom, concerned about compliance. She argued that the "highly 
partisan or ideological judicial selection process . . . tends to undermine 
public confidence in the legitimacy of the courts." 253 The resulting "loss of 
public confidence in the legitimacy of the courts-confidence that courts 
will decide impartially, in accordance with the rule of law-could, in turn,
54 undermine compliance by the public with unpopular decisions." 2 
Notably, some commentators have suggested that President Trump's 
attacks on lower federal courts were an attempt to undermine their public 
reputation so that it would be easier for the Trump Administration to defy 
a court order going forward.255 My own work tracing the historical norms 
of judicial independence suggests that such concerns are not without 
foundation. As that work recounts, since at least the mid-twentieth century, 
there has been a strong norm of compliance with federal court orders. 256 
But this norm developed in part because of bipartisan political rhetoric 
that treated noncompliance as off-the-wall.257 Accordingly, this norm-like 
251. See The Federalist No. 78, at 392 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) 
("The judiciary ... has no influence over either the sword or the purse .... It ... must 
ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its 
judgments."). 
252. Gibson et al., supra note 36, at 839. 
253. King, supra note 230, at 782. 
254. Id. 
255. See Siegel, Reciprocal Legitimation, supra note 45, at 1244-45 (noting "the 
concern that the President may be trying to establish a narrative that he can use after an 
attack in order to rally a fearful public into accepting his disregard of judicial authority"). 
Other commentators have questioned whether the Trump Administration would adhere to 
adverse federal court orders. See Aaron Blake, Constitutional Crisis? What Happens if 
Trump Decides to Ignore a Judge's Ruling., Wash. Post: The Fix (Feb. 5, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/02/05/constitutional-crisis-
what-happens-if-trump-decides-to-ignore-a-judge (on file with the Columbia Law Review); 
Nina Totenberg, Trump's Criticism ofJudges Out of Line with Past Presidents, NPR (Feb. 
11, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/02/11/514587731/trumps-criticism-of-judges-out-
of-line-with-past-presidents [https://perma.cc/P6RG-PAUK] (reporting these concerns). 
256. See Grove, Judicial Independence, supra note 9, at 488-505, 531-32. 
257. See id. at 498-505, 531-32 (noting also the lack of contrary rhetoric). 
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other norms ofjudicial independence-may be weakened if the rhetoric 
surrounding the federal judiciary changes. 258 
To be sure, it is difficult to assess the degree or immediacy of any risk 
of defiance by the federal executive branch. The Trump Administration, 
for its part, generally endeavored to comply with adverse federal court 
decrees. 25 9 But the very fact that observers have raised these concerns 
underscores an implicit recognition of the importance of sociological 
legitimacy-not only for the Supreme Court but also for the inferior fed-
eral bench. Threats to the "perceived legitimacy of the [inferior] federal 
judiciary" are "a worrisome development for an unelected branch in a 
system of representative government. "260 
258. See id. at 544 ("These conventions of judicial independence ... could be 
deconstructed ... if we alter the way in which we think and talk about the federal judicial 
power."); cf. Aziz Z. Huq, Why Judicial Independence Fails, 115 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1055,1115-
18 (2021) (suggesting that the increasingly partisan nature of the judicial appointments 
process at both the Supreme Court and lower federal court level might be problematic for 
judicial independence). 
259. See Grove, Judicial Independence, supra note 9, at 501 (noting the Trump Admin-
istration's compliance with the injunctions blocking the President's travel bans as of early 
2018); see also Tara Leigh Grove, The Power of "So-CalledJudges," 93 N.Y.U. L. Rev. Online 
14, 17-20 (2018) (arguing that the federal executive has political and institutional 
incentives to comply). Two recent cases warrant mention. First, according to media reports, 
in early 2020, DHS removed an individual from the United States, despite a federal court 
order granting a stay of removal. But DHS asserted that it did not knowingly violate a court 
order because the individual was on the plane before DHS received a copy of the order. See 
Deirdre Fernandes, Northeastern Student from Iran Removed from U.S. Is Just the Latest 
Sent Away at Logan, Bos. Globe (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.bostonglobe.com/2020/01/ 
21/metro/iranian-student-removed-us-before-court-hearing-lawyer-says (on file with the 
Columbia LawReview). The second case involves litigation over the 2020 census. In fall 2020, 
a federal district court found invalid the Trump Administration's decision to stop counting 
on September 30, 2020-and indicated that counting should continue until the (previously 
announced) October 31 deadline. See Nat'l Urb. League v. Ross, 489 F. Supp. 3d 939, 1003 
(N.D. Cal. 2020). The Census Bureau then announced that the count would cease on 
October 5. The district court accused the Administration of disobeying the earlier order, 
directed the Administration to inform all census takers that the count would continue until 
the end of October, and threatened executive officials with sanctions or contempt if they 
failed to comply with the new order. See Hansi Lo Wang, After 'Egregious' Violation, Judge 
Orders Census to Count Through Oct. 31 for Now, NPR (Oct. 2, 2020), https://www.npr.org/ 
2020/10/02/919224602/after-egregious-violation-judge-orders-census-to-count-through-
oct-31-for-now [https://perma.cc/7B3L-RB3U]. At that point, the Census Bureau com-
plied, indicating that the count would continue until October 31. See 2020 Census Will 
Continue Until October 31 After Successful Legal Challenge, ABC News (Oct. 3, 2020), 
https://abc3.com/census-2020-u.s.-bureau-vote/6725827 [https://perma.cc/9JU7-RNV7]. 
The Census Bureau changed its approach again only after the district court's order was 
stayed by the Supreme Court. See Ross v. Nat'l Urb. League, 141 S. Ct. 18, 18 (2020); 
Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs, Adam Liptak & Michael Wines, The Census, the Supreme Court 
and Why the Count Is Stopping Early, N.Y. Times (Jan. 18, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
article/census-supreme-court-ruling.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
260. Binder & Maltzman, Advice, supra note 31, at 11. 
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D. The Likelihood of a Tradeoff 
This Essay argues that, when the Supreme Court is invited to change 
the law in high-profile and contested areas, the Justices may face an 
unappealing tradeoff. To preserve the external legitimacy of the Court, 
the Justices may feel pressure not to issue the broad, rule-like doctrines 
that can most effectively guide the lower courts. The Justices may thereby 
not only sacrifice meaningful legal change but also pose risks for the long-
term sociological legitimacy of the inferior federal bench. 
How likely are the Justices to face such a tradeoff? In recent work, Neil 
Siegel asserts that, at least in a subset of salient cases, the Supreme Court 
may be able to work with the inferior federal courts to promote the 
legitimacy of both. 261 Siegel points to recent litigation over same-sex 
marriage: The Court in United States v. Windsorstruck down the Defense of 
Marriage Act, which prohibited the federal government from recognizing 
state-approved same-sex marriages. 262 Lower federal courts then, Siegel 
argues, used Windsor "to legitimate their [subsequent] decisions" striking 
down state bans on same-sex marriage.263 And when the Supreme Court 
itself required states to recognize same-sex marriage in Obergefellv. Hodges, 
the Court sought to "blunt threats to its own legitimacy by invoking those 
[earlier] district and circuit court decisions."2" Siegel describes this 
65 phenomenon as "reciprocal legitimation." 2 
Siegel identifies an important phenomenon-one that seems to 
capture the same-sex marriage saga. But "reciprocal legitimation" seems 
unlikely to work with respect to many high-profile issues today. This 
phenomenon envisions a federal judiciary that shares a common project-
and thus seeks to push the law in a single direction. As Siegel describes, in 
the wake of Windsor, both a majority ofJustices and most inferior federal 
judges ruled in favor of marriage equality.266 
261. See Siegel, Reciprocal Legitimation, supra note 45, at 1186-87. 
262. 570 U.S. 744, 757-58, 769-70, 775 (2013); see also Siegel, Reciprocal Legitimation, 
supra note 45, at 1186-87 (discussing Windsorand recent same-sex marriage litigation). 
263. Siegel, Reciprocal Legitimation, supra note 45, at 1186. 
264. Id. at 1186; see also Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 662-63, app. A (2015) 
(collecting cases). 
265. Siegel, Reciprocal Legitimation, supra note 45, at 1186 ("The process is reciprocal 
because lower federal courts and the Supreme Court each enlist he support of the other."). 
For a different perspective on this litigation, see Emily Buss, The Divisive Supreme Court, 
2016 Sup. Ct. Rev. 25, 25-26 (arguing that the Supreme Court should have denied certiorari 
in Obergefell and left the issue to the lower federal courts, who serve as "federal 
representatives of the people of their states"). 
266. See Siegel, Reciprocal Legitimation, supra note 45, at 1204, 1226-27 (stating that 
the Court may use this approach if it anticipates that it can "persuade other federal courts 
to decide an issue in the Court's preferred way"). Siegel argues that a similar phenomenon 
occurred with respect to reapportionment and desegregation outside the school context. 
See id. at 1186, 1203-05. Siegel focuses on Brown, arguing that, by ruling only on school 
segregation, the Court invited lower courts to invalidate desegregation in other contexts, 
such as restaurants, streetcars, and parks-and that lower courts largely accepted that 
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But such a common project seems unlikely with respect to many of 
the high-profile issues that are the focus of commentary today. As we have 
seen, absent guidance from the Supreme Court, Democratic- and 
Republican-appointed lower court judges often vote in distinct ways on 
issues such as abortion, affirmative action, and gun rights. The lower 
courts thus seem likely to push the law in opposing directions-and develop 
a patchwork of disparate decisions (as happened in the wake of Brown II 
and Casey)-ratherthan converge on a common project. 
That is particularly true given that the lower federal judiciary has for 
some time been an ideological patchwork. Over the past several decades, 
the presidency has repeatedly changed hands between the Republican and 
Democratic parties. And since Reagan, each President has sought to influ-
ence the ideological direction of the lower federal courts. When Reagan 
entered office in 1981, more than sixty percent of the federaljudiciary had 
been selected by Democratic Presidents.2 67 By the end of his presidency, 
Reagan alone had appointed nearly half of the judiciary (forty-seven 
percent), creating a majority of Republican appointees.2 68 Following the 
Clinton presidency, the inferior federal courts were roughly evenly split 
69 between Democratic-and Republican-appointed jurists. 2 And although 
George W. Bush increased the number of Republican appointees, 270 
President Obama largely evened the balance during his first term in 
office. 271 Obama made ven greater strides after Democrats eliminated the 
filibuster (and before Republicans retook the Senate), such that he "was 
finally able to shift the overall partisan balance on the lower federal courts 
in the Democrats' favor." 272 Over four years, with a Republican-controlled 
invitation. See id. at 1203-05. This Essay does not seek to contest Siegel's historical account 
as to desegregation outside the school context. For present purposes, the important point 
is that reciprocal legitimation is most likely to work when the Supreme Court and the 
inferior federal judiciary are engaged in a common project. In our currently divided 
polity-with increasingly divided courts-that seems unlikely in various salient areas. 
267. See Goldman, Picking Federal Judges, supra note 89, at 260. 
268. See Goldman, Reagan, supra note 182, at 318-19. 
269. See Binder & Maltzman, Advice, supra note 31, at 102 (noting that, even by 2002, 
"the active judiciary was composed of 380 judges appointed by Republican presidents and 
389 judges appointed by Democratic presidents"). 
270. See Slotnick et al., supra note 233, at 410 (stating that, at the beginning of Obama's 
presidency, "the cohort ofjudges appointed by Democrats" was 39.1%). 
271. Binder & Maltzman, New Wars, supra note 231, at 56 ("After four years of Obama 
appointments... , the bench is coming closer to parity .... "). 
272. Slotnick et al., supra note 233, at 410, 414-15 (finding that "the cohort of judges 
appointed by Democrats increased from 39.1% to 51.6%" and that eight of the twelve 
regional courts of appeals had Democratic majorities); see also Anne Joseph O'Connell, 
Shortening Agency and Judicial Vacancies Through Filibuster Reform? An Examination of 
Confirmation Rates and Delays from 1981 to 2014, 64 Duke L.J. 1645, 1649-50 (2015); U.S. 
Courts, Judgeship Appointments by President, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/ 
files/apptsbypres.pdf [https://perma.cc/DJ4Z-J3H7] (reporting that Obama appointed 
268 district judges and forty-nine regional appellate court judges, for a total of 317). One 
recent study argues that the elimination of the filibuster itself is likely to lead to a more 
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Senate (and no filibuster), President Trump again transformed the lower 
federal courts. Trump alone appointed around 200 judges, including over 
3one-quarter of the federal courts of appeals.2 7 Yet many Democratic-
appointed jurists remain on the federal bench.274 
Accordingly, for the past several decades, the lower federal judiciary 
has been populated by a mix of Republican and Democratic appointees. 
This mix likely does not matter in many areas of law. But as we have seen, 
in certain high-profile contexts, when Supreme Court doctrine is opaque, 
there is a noticeable difference in the voting patterns of Democratic-and 
Republican-appointed jurists. That is why the Justices have good reason to 
articulate broad, rule-like doctrines to guide their judicial inferiors. By 
contrast, when the Court fails to provide such guidance, lower courtjudges 
are unlikely to converge on a common approach. Instead, we can expect 
to see what we in fact do see: noticeable differences in lower court 
decisions in salient cases-in ways that raise the stakes for judicial 
appointments and pose risks for the long-term legitimacy of the inferior 
federal bench. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS 
This Essay aims in large part to draw attention to two (related) 
phenomena that have been overlooked in the literature: the potential 
tradeoffs between legal change and legitimacy, and between Supreme 
Court and lower court legitimacy. To preserve the sociological legitimacy 
of the Court, the Justices may sacrifice both meaningful legal change and 
the long-term reputation of the remainder of the federal bench. This Part 
argues that these tradeoffs complicate several practical and theoretical 
debates about the role of the federal judiciary in the constitutional 
scheme. 
A. What It Takesfor a ConstitutionalRevolution 
Those who follow the Supreme Court from time to time predict a 
constitutional revolution. Today, commentators forecast an overhaul of 
the Court'sjurisprudence on topics including abortion, affirmative action, 
polarized judiciary. See Jonathan Remy Nash & Joanna Shepherd, Filibuster Change and 
Judicial Appointments, 17J. Empirical Legal Stud. 646, 649 (2020). 
273. See Devan Cole & Ted Barrett, Senate Confirms Trump's 200thJudicial Nominee, 
CNN (June 24, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/24/politics/trump-200-judicial-
appointments-cory-wilson/index.html [https://perma.cc/X4RT-NQKP]; see also Joan 
Biskupic, Trump Transformed the Supreme Court that Mostly Helped Advance His Agenda, 
CNN (Jan. 19, 2021), https://www.cnn.com/2021/01/19/politics/trump-supreme-court-
legacy/index.html [https://perma.cc/EU4J-DF9W] ("After four years, the President has 
filled 177 of the 682 district court judgeships (26%) and 54 of the 179 appeals court 
judgeships (30%) .... "). 
274. See supra notes 271-272 and accompanying text. 
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gun rights, and the administrative state.27 5 But this Essay suggests that any 
such revolution faces significant obstacles. 
In order to ensure a revolution in the high-profile areas that are of 
interest to commentators, the Justices should issue broad, rule-like 
doctrines. Such precedents would most effectively guide-and constrain-
the lower courts. But out of concern for the legitimacy of the Supreme 
Court as a whole, the Justices may feel pressure not to issue broad, rule-like 
precedents in precisely those high-profile areas. Instead, the Justices may 
opt for more open-ended standards or deny certiorari entirely. In our 
federal judiciary-where the lower courts have for decades been 
populated by a mix of Democratic and Republican appointees (with 
fundamentally different perspectives on issues such as abortion, 
affirmative action, and gun rights)-opaque tests are unlikely to lead to 
any revolution. Instead, we are likely to see a patchwork of highly variant 
lower court rulings-as occurred in the wake of Brown IIand Casey. 
We may soon see a similar pattern with respect to the administrative 
state. Conservative and libertarian elites have, in recent years, led a 
sustained attack on government regulation (a trend that Gillian Metzger 
dubbed "anti-administrativism"),276 and many observers in June 2019 ex-
pected the Supreme Court to begin a revolution in administrative law-by 
reversing prior decisions that require deference to agency interpretations 
of regulations: Auer deference. 27  Instead, Justice Kagan's majority opinion 
in Kisor v. Wilkie purported to reaffirm Auer, while crafting a complex new 
five-part test, such that "Auer deference is sometimes appropriate and 
sometimes not." 278 
Kisor not only failed to provide the legal change sought by 
conservatives and libertarians but also seems likely to put considerable 
pressure on the inferior federal judiciary. As some commentators have 
observed, the scope of "Kisordeference" will depend heavily on the lower 
275. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text (collecting sources). Recent events are 
likely to deepen these concerns. Just before this Essay went to press, the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari in a gun rights case (although it narrowed the question on review). See 
supra note 218. The Court also opted to hear a case involving a state law that, with few 
exceptions, prohibits abortion after fifteen weeks. See Brent Kendall &Jess Bravin, Supreme 
Court to Review Mississippi Law Limiting Abortion Rights, Wall St. J. (May 17, 2021), 
https://www.wsj .com/articles/supreme-court-to-consider-abortion-restrictions-from-
mississippi-11621259099 (on file with the ColumbiaLaw Review). 
276. Metzger, Administrative State, supra note 5, at 3-7, 64-69 (critiquing the "attack 
on the national administrative state" led by "business interests and conservative forces"); 
see also Christopher J. Walker, Attacking Auerand ChevronDeference: A Literature Review, 
16 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 103, 104 (2018) (detailing "a growing call from the federal bench, 
on the Hill, and within the legal academy to rethink" administrative deference doctrines). 
277. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997); Tom Lorenzen, Dan Wolff & 
Sharmistha Das, The Final Auer Midnight Approaches for an Important Deference 
Doctrine, ABA (March 8, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/environment 
energyresources/publications/trends/2018-2019/march-april-2019/the-final-auer (on 
file with the Columbia Law Review) ("The demise of Auer seems imminent."). 
278. 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2408, 2414-18 (2019). 
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79 federal courts. 2 And Kisor comes on the legal scene at a time when 
Presidents, senators, and interest groups are already more closely focused 
on judicial attitudes toward the administrative state.280 According to then-
Trump White House Counsel Don McGahn, a new "litmus test" for 
Republican judicial appointees at all levels is skepticism toward federal 
regulation. 281 Thus, like Casey, Kisormayincrease the pressure on the lower 
court selection process, with Republicans and Democrats seeking to put 
individuals with the "correct views" on the inferior federal bench. 
The Justices have repeatedly proven resistant to issuing the broad, 
rule-like doctrines needed to guide the inferior federal courts in certain 
high-profile contexts. This analysis not only underscores the difficulty of a 
Supreme Court-led revolution as a descriptive matter but also has 
significant normative implications for scholarly debates over judicial 
legitimacy-to which this Essay now turns. 
B. The NarrowFocus on Supreme CourtLegitimacy 
Prominent scholars have argued that the Supreme Court should 
decide cases so as to preserve its sociological legitimacy.28 2 Notably, the 
force of this argument depends in part on a given Justice's approach to 
constitutional interpretation; some interpretive methods likely foreclose 
such considerations. But, significantly for purposes of this Essay, the 
argument also reflects scholars' singular emphasis on the Supreme Court. 
As the next section explores, the normative question-should the Justices 
aim to protect the Court's reputation?-becomes far more challenging 
once we consider the entire federal judiciary. 
1. A Contingency: Interpretive Method. - At the outset, this Essay 
addresses a preliminary question: whether it is legally legitimate for a 
279. See Gillian E. Metzger, The Roberts Court and Administrative Law, 2019 Sup. Ct. 
Rev. 1, 8, 66 (noting that the Court "punt[ed] the difficult questions back to the lower 
courts," and thus, "it will be how the lower courts apply Kisor... that will establish Kisor's 
impact on administrative law in practice"); Christopher J. Walker, What KisorMeans for the 
Future of Auer Deference: The New Five-Step KisorDeference Doctrine, Yale J. on Regul.: 
Notice & Comment (June 26, 2019), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/what-kisor-means-for-
the-future-of-auer-deference-the-new-five-step-kisor-deference-doctrine [https://perma.cc/ 
WY9W-77RH] (comparing the Kisor test to the "less-deferential Skidmore doctrine, under 
which administrative interpretations of law receive deference based on their 'power to 
persuade"'). 
280. See supra note 276 and accompanying text. 
281. Jeremy W. Peters, Trump's NewJudicial Litmus Test: Shrinking 'the Administrative 
State', N.Y. Times (Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/26/us/politics/ 
trump-judges-courts-administrative-state.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review); see 
also Craig Green, Deconstructing the Administrative State: Constitutional Debates over 
Chevron and Political Transformation in American Law 109-10 (Temple Univ. Legal Stud. 
Rsch. Paper No. 2018-35, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3264482 (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) (discussing the Trump Administration's efforts to "deconstruct" the 
administrative state by "decreasing administrative flexibility, endorsing judicially imposed 
constitutional limits, and appointing Neil Gorsuch to the Supreme Court"). 
282. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text. 
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Justice to take external legitimacy into account in deciding cases. The 
answer depends in significant part on ajustice's approach to constitutional 
interpretation. Notably, throughout this discussion, the Essay presumes 
that there is no one "correct" interpretive method, and thus each 
individual judge has substantial discretion to select her preferred 
interpretive approach. 28 The goal here is to explore whether some 
methods could be open to the consideration of external legitimacy. 
In past work, I have suggested that, under a variety of interpretive 
methods, it is not legally legitimate for a Justice to switch a vote-by, for 
example, voting to uphold rather than strike down a law-in order to 
84protect the Supreme Court's public reputation.2 But my past work did 
not address whether ajustice may consider sociological legitimacy at all-
for example, in fashioning an operative doctrine such as "all deliberate 
speed" or "undue burden." This Essay takes up that question. 
Under some methods of interpretation, any reliance on sociological 
legitimacy is likely legally illegitimate. For example, under prominent 
versions of originalism, judges have an obligation to enforce the original 
meaning of constitutional provisions. 2 5 Such an approach should exclude 
consideration of the Court's modern-day reputation. 28 6 
283. Cf. Fallon, Law and Legitimacy, supra note 43, at 131 (making a similar 
assumption); Abbe R. Gluck & Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation on the Bench: 
A Survey of Forty-TwoJudges on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 1298, 1345 
(2018) (finding that a majority of lower court judges surveyed believe either that the 
Supreme Court cannot dictate a method of statutory interpretation or that it does not do so 
in a fashion that is consistent enough to be precedential). 
284. See Grove, Legitimacy Dilemma, supra note 8, at 2245-46, 2254-72 (arguing that 
such switches are likely not legally legitimate and must thus be justified, if at all, on 
alternative normative grounds). Some commentators allege that Chief Justice Roberts 
switched his vote in NFIB v. Sebelius, which upheld the Affordable Care Act's individual 
mandate under the federal taxing power. See 567 U.S. 519, 575 (2012); Grove, Legitimacy 
Dilemma, supra note 8, at 2243, 2254-55; see also Joan Biskupic, The Chief: The Life and 
Turbulent Times of ChiefJustice John Roberts 221-22, 233-48 (2019) (detailing the Chief 
Justice's change in a chapter entitled "A Switch in Time"). 
285. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in 
Original Meaning, 91 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1, 1 (2015) (underscoring that "two core ideas 
of originalist constitutional theory" are that "[t]he meaning of the constitutional text is 
fixed when each provision is framed and ratified" and that "the original meaning of the 
constitutional text should constrain constitutional practice"). But see Stephen E. Sachs, 
Originalism Without Text, 127 Yale L.J. 156, 157 (2017) (arguing that the "conventional" 
view is "mistaken" and that "[o] riginalism is not about the text"). 
286. Some versions of new originalism may allow the consideration of "sociological 
legitimacy" as part of the construction zone. See infra note 295 and accompanying text. 
Originalist approaches that take a more positivist turn-and argue for originalism on the 
ground that it is "our law"-are a more complex case. One would presumably need evidence 
that the Court looked to sociological legitimacy in its early days-and perhaps that it did so 
candidly and openly. For the positivist theory, see William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 
115 Colum. L. Rev. 2349, 2351-53, 2363-86 (2015); Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a 
Theory of Legal Change, 38 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 817, 844-74 (2015). One might need 
similar evidence for original methods originalism, a theory that advocates using only those 
interpretive rules in place around the time that the Constitution was adopted. For an 
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The opinions of two prominent originalists help to illustrate this 
point. In Casey, Justice Scalia was "appalled by[] the Court's suggestion" 
that a judicial decision "must be strongly influenced" by "public 
opposition .... Instead of engaging in the hopeless task of predicting 
public perception-a job not for lawyers but for political campaign 
managers-the Justices should do what is legally right . "287 Along the 
same lines, Justice Thomas chastised the Court for denying certiorari in a 
case involving Medicaid benefits because "some respondents ... are 
named 'Planned Parenthood."' 288 Justice Thomas insisted that even a 
"tenuous connection to [the] politically fraught issue [of abortion] does 
notjustify abdicating our judicial duty. If anything, neutrally applying the 
law is all the more important when political issues are in the 
background."289 
Ronald Dworkin's theory of law as integrity also largely forecloses 
reliance on sociological legitimacy. Under this approach,judges must find 
the "right answer" to legal questions by relying on text, history, and "moral 
principles about political decency and justice."29 0 According to Dworkin, 
the Justices should not decline to recognize constitutional rights in order 
9 1 to protect the "standing and legitimacy" of the Supreme Court.2 
Although this theory does leave room for consideration of sociological le-
gitimacy in extraordinary cases-"if the authority of the Supreme Court 
or of the constitutional arrangement as a whole were actually at stake"-
account of original methods originalism, see John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, 
Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against 
Construction, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 751, 751-53, 758-72 (2009). 
287. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 997-99 (1992) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting); see also id. at 998 ("[W]hether it would 'subvert the Court's legitimacy' or not, 
the notion that we would decide a case differently from the way we otherwise would have in 
order to show that we can stand firm against public disapproval is frightening."). 
288. Gee v. Planned Parenthood of Gulf Coast, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 408, 408-09 (2018) 
(Thomas,J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (arguing that the Court should resolve 
the question presented-involving private rights of action under Medicaid-and stating: 
"So what explains the Court's refusal to do itsjob here? I suspect it has something to do with 
the fact that some respondents in these cases are named 'Planned Parenthood"'). Justices 
Alito and Gorsuch joined the opinion. Id. at 408. 
289. Id. at 410. 
290. Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution 2-
3, 10-11 (1996) (advocating a "moral reading" of the abstract clauses of the Constitution); 
see also Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes 41-43, 133-34 (2006) [hereinafter Dworkin, 
Justice in Robes] (reiterating the moral reading and advocating the one-right-answer 
thesis); Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 266-71 (1986) (advocating the one-right-answer 
thesis and discussing criticisms). 
291. Dworkin, Justice in Robes, supra note 290, at 256-58 (arguing against such a 
"passive or cautionary strategy"). Admittedly, Dworkin does not focus on implementing doc-
trines (such as "all deliberate speed" or "undue burden"), so it is possible that his theory 
would work differently in that context. But his analysis seems, at a minimum, to cast doubt 
on the legal legitimacy of any consideration of sociological legitimacy. 
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Dworkin is skeptical that such a situation is likely to arise. 29 2 Accordingly, 
this theory does not seem to countenance reliance on external legitimacy. 
Many other interpretive approaches, however, seem open to at least 
some consideration of sociological legitimacy. That is, under these meth-
ods, it may be legally legitimate for a justice to articulate legal doctrine so 
as to safeguard the Supreme Court's external reputation. For example, a 
Justice who favors pragmatism, 293 common law constitutionalism, 294 and 
95 some forms of new originalism, 2 may take into account functional con-
cerns.296 And there is a strong functional reason for the Justices to consider 
sociological legitimacy in formulating doctrine: "[B] ecause the Court's 
power depends on its image, in order to maintain its effectiveness, the 
97 Court must take care to preserve the esteem in which it is held." 2 
292. Id. at 259 ("I'm tempted to think ... [the Court] can survive almost anything."). 
293. See Richard A. Posner, HowJudges Think 230-50 (2008) (advocating pragmatism). 
294. See David A. Strauss, The Living Constitution 43-49 (2010) (articulating and 
defending common law constitutionalism). 
295. Some versions of new originalism would seem to allow the consideration of 
"sociological legitimacy" as part of the construction zone. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Living 
Originalism 179-82 (2011) (relying, in part, on functional concerns in examining the 
implementation of the Commerce Clause over time). 
296. Philip Bobbitt's Constitutional Fate does not focus on operative doctrines such as 
"all deliberate speed." But Bobbitt endorses Alexander Bickel's passive virtues more 
generally, suggesting that the Court's legitimacy is an acceptable "prudential" concern in 
constitutional decisionmaking. See Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the 
Constitution 66-69, 213 (1982) (favorably discussing Bickel's view that, "by prudently 
avoiding some controversies and by handling others in subtle, indirect ways the Court could 
preserve its independence and authority for those few cases that should be decided on the 
merits"); id. at 7 (identifying various acceptable modalities of constitutional argument, 
including historical, textual, structural, prudential, doctrinal, and ethical arguments); see 
also infra section IV.B.2 (discussing Bickel's passive virtues). 
297. Hellman, supra note 25, at 1151; see also Wells, supra note 25, at 1015 (" [T]he 
Court, in order to achieve its goals, has to be concerned with what other people think of 
it."). There is, however, one complication. Many scholars assert that the Justices cannot 
openly admit that they considered sociological legitimacy. See, e.g., Wells, supra note 25, at 
1051 (arguing that the Justices should sometimes subordinate legal legitimacy-defined as 
candor in legal reasoning-to the imperative of achieving "sociological legitimacy"); see 
also Scott C. Idleman, A Prudential Theory ofJudicial Candor, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 1307, 1356, 
1388-94 (1995) (urging that "full candor may harm perceived judicial legitimacy" in some 
contexts). But see Hellman, supra note 25, at 1149-50 (advocating "[t]he candidrecognition 
of the importance of the continued vitality of the Court"). That is, the Justices may have to 
sacrifice what many view as a central element of legal legitimacy:judicial candor. See Fallon, 
Law and Legitimacy, supra note 43, at 129-32, 142-48; Micah Schwartzman, Judicial 
Sincerity, 94 Va. L. Rev. 987, 990-91 (2008) (defending an approach in which "judges have 
a general duty to comply with a principle of sincerity in their decisionmaking"); David L. 
Shapiro, In Defense ofJudicial Candor, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 731, 736-38 (1987) (advocating 
"a strong presumption in favor of candor"); see also Henry P. Monaghan, Taking Supreme 
Court Opinions Seriously, 39 Md. L. Rev. 1, 25 (1979) (suggesting that opinions should 
include all the grounds on which judges relied); cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Theory of 
Judicial Candor, 117 Colum. L. Rev. 2265, 2282-83 (2017) (articulating a minimal and ideal 
norm of candor in judicial decisionmaking). There may thus be another tradeoff: in this 
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2. Saving the Court: Minimalism and the Passive Virtues. - Many inter-
pretive methods thus seem to allow the Justices to articulate doctrine with 
an eye toward preserving the Supreme Court's external reputation. Yet 
how should the Justices go about that task? Scholars do not always explain 
this point with great clarity, but Alexander Bickel and Cass Sunstein have 
concrete suggestions: The Justices should issue narrow or open-ended 
("minimalist") rulings, or perhaps avoid deciding cases entirely, in order 
to deflect "public outrage."2 98 This work vividly illustrates the tendency of 
scholars to focus on the external legitimacy of the Supreme Court alone. 
In The Least Dangerous Branch, Bickel famously articulates the 
"countermajoritarian difficulty," the idea that the Supreme Court's power 
ofjudicial review is "a deviant institution in the American democracy. "299 
But importantly, Bickel's goal is not to undermine Supreme Court review. 
On the contrary, he seeks to defend the Court's constitutional role-and 
to articulate how it can be exercised cautiously and prudently.300 Bickel 
aims to show how the Justices can decide cases so as to safeguard 
constitutional rights, while also protecting the Supreme Court's long-term 
sociological legitimacy. 
Part of Bickel's answer lies in what he dubs the "passive virtues": The 
Court should use jurisdictional devices (such as standing, the political 
question doctrine, and certiorari dismissals) to "stay[] its hand" in some 
301 controversial cases so that the Court can play its full role in other cases. 
But Bickel does not focus exclusively on jurisdiction. Bickel also applauds 
the "all deliberate speed" formula as a way to reconcile principle with ex-
pediency.302 Given the possibility of noncompliance by segregationists, 
Bickel argues, the Supreme Court was correct to reject the "shock 
treatment" proposed by the NAACP and instead to allow a more gradual 
approach. 303 Through "all deliberate speed"-a phrase that, according to 
case, between legal and sociological legitimacy. A full examination of this issue is beyond 
the scope of this Essay. But I hope to explore it in future work. 
298. Cass R. Sunstein, If People Would Be Outraged by Their Rulings, Should Judges 
Care?, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 155, 158-59 (2007) [hereinafter Sunstein, Outraged]. 
299. See Bickel, Least Dangerous Branch, supra note 26, at 16-18. 
300. See id. at 132; see also Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The 
History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 Yale L.J. 153, 159 (2002) 
(emphasizing that "The Least DangerousBranchwas a defense of judicial review"). 
301. Bickel, Least Dangerous Branch, supra note 26, at 69-72, 112-33. See generally 
Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term-Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 
Harv. L. Rev. 40 (1961) (discussing the Supreme Court's use of doctrines like standing and 
political question to decline the exercise of jurisdiction otherwise granted to it). For a 
prominent critique, see generally Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive 
Virtues"-A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 
1 (1964) (advancing various difficulties with Bickel's thesis). For discussion of additional 
critiques of Bickel, see Henry Paul Monaghan, On Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda Control, 
and Related Matters, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 665, 714-18 (2012). 
302. See Bickel, Least Dangerous Branch, supra note 26, at 253-54. 
303. Id. at 250, 252-53 (arguing that caution was the wiser approach, particularly given 
that "resistance could be expected"). 
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Bickel, "resembles poetry"-"[t]he Court placed itself in position to en-
gage in a continual colloquy with the political institutions" and enable 
them to gradually accept the principle of desegregation.304 
Bickel expressly states in The Least DangerousBranchthat he does not 
seek to address the lower federal bench.3 05 According to Bickel, "[I] n no 
event is constitutional adjudication in the lower federal courts the 
equivalent of what can be had in the Supreme Court." 306 "[T] he lower 
courts can act in constitutional matters as stop-gap or relatively ministerial 
decisionmakers only. "307 
Even in 1962, when Bickel first published The Least DangerousBranch, 
that was an extraordinary statement. As this Essay has underscored, the 
success (or failure) of desegregation depended tremendously on the "fifty-
eight lonely men" who, at the time, comprised the inferior federal 
judiciary across the South. 30 As Judge Wisdom explained in 1967, 
"[T] here [were] so few Supreme Court decisions on school desegregation 
that inferior courts must improvise . . . . To this extent, the [courts of 
appeals were] forced into a policy-making position as to decisions only 
tangentially dependent on the Supreme Court." 309 
Bickel is not alone in his singular emphasis on the Supreme Court. 
Most of the literature on the Court's sociological legitimacy has likewise 
overlooked the remainder of the federal judiciary.310 For example, 
building on his work on judicial minimalism 311 Sunstein argues that the 
Justices should at times issue narrow rulings in order to deflect "public 
outrage. "312 Such a minimalist approach is particularly urgent today, 
Sunstein insists, as Supreme Court watchers anticipate a constitutional 
revolution: Following the appointment of Justices by President Trump, 
"the nation could be in for a wild ride" with respect to issues including 
abortion and affirmative action, such that "the meaning of the 
Constitution looks a lot like the political convictions of the Republican 
304. Id. at 253-54. 
305. Id. at 198 ("I have not addressed myself, in this chapter or elsewhere, to the role 
of the lower federal courts .... "). 
306. Id. at 126. 
307. Id. at 198. 
308. Peltason, supra note 54, at 28-29; see also supra section II.A.2 (describing the 
discretion that federal district judges wielded over the pace of desegregation in their 
respective districts). 
309. Wisdom, supra note 84, at 426-27. 
310. See supra notes 42-45. 
311. See, e.g., Sunstein, One Case, supra note 26, at 3-23 (advocating minimalism). 
312. See Sunstein, Outraged, supra note 298, at 158-59, 169-75, 211 (aiming to justify 
this approach largely on consequentialist grounds); see also Andrew B. Coan, Well, Should 
They? A Response to If People Would Be Outraged by Their Rulings, ShouldJudges Care?, 60 
Stan. L. Rev. 213, 215 (2007) (suggesting that "judgesshould care about public outrage 
out of respect for democracy" (emphasis omitted)). 
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Party."313 Sunstein argues: "That would be ugly and dangerous .... As 
much as any time in American history, this is a period for judicial 
minimalism" at the Supreme Court.314 
C. Expanding the Focus to the EntireJudiciary 
When one focuses exclusively on the Supreme Court, it is easy to see 
the appeal of narrow rulings or certiorari denials in high-profile areas. 
Broad, rule-like doctrines seem likely to trigger attacks on the Court. 
Indeed, today, we see signs of precisely that. As commentators forecast a 
complete overhaul of Supreme Court doctrine-on issues such as 
abortion, affirmative action, and gun rights-there has been an uptick in 
anti-Court rhetoric. 315 Some critics advocate strong measures: It may be 
time to end life tenure (by statute) ,316 strip federaljurisdiction,317 impeach 
313. Cass R. Sunstein, Kavanaugh Confirmation Won't Affect Supreme Court's 
Legitimacy, Bloomberg (Sept. 30, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/ 
2018-09-30/kavanaugh-confirmation-won-t-affect-supreme-court-s-legitimacy (on file with 
the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Sunstein, Kavanaugh Confirmation] (arguing that, 
given the "cloud" cast by the Kavanaugh hearings on the Court's legitimacy, "[a]s much as 
any time in American history, this is a period forjudicial minimalism"). Sunstein made these 
comments following the appointments of Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh. But this 
argument could be seen as even more pressing in the wake ofJustice Ginsburg's death, and 
Justice Barrett's subsequent appointment to the Court. See supra notes 8-9 (noting that 
these events seem to have led to an increase in the attacks on the Court's legitimacy). 
314. Sunstein, Kavanaugh Confirmation, supra note 313. 
315. See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text. This rhetoric has only increased since 
the tragic passing of Justice Ginsburg. See Matt Ford, The Consequences of Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg's Death for American Democracy, New Republic (Sept. 18, 2020), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/159425/consequences-ruth-bader-ginsburgs-death-
american-democracy [https://perma.cc/6G6Q-PBR2] (arguing that Justice Ginsburg's 
"death amplifies a growing legitimacy crisis for the Supreme Court"); see also David Yaffe-
Bellany, Liberals Weigh Jurisdiction Stripping to Rein in Supreme Court, Bloomberg (Oct. 
6, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-10-06/to-rein-in-supreme-court-
some-democrats-consider-jurisdiction-stripping (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
(noting that "progressive lawmakers and left-wing activists are calling for" term limits, court 
packing, and jurisdiction stripping, as they "[f]ac[e] the prospect of a 6-3 conservative 
majority on the high court following the death ofJustice Ruth Bader Ginsburg"). 
316. See Ian Ayres &John Fabian Witt, Opinion, Democrats Need a Plan B for the Supreme 
Court. Here's One Option., Wash. Post (July 27, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
opinions/democrats-need-a-plan-b-for-the-supreme-court-heres-one-option/2018/07/27/ 
4c77fd4e-91a6-11e8-b769-e3fffl7f0689_story.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
(advocating a statute setting "18-year terms ... followed by life tenure" on a lower federal 
court); Kermit Roosevelt & Ruth-Helen Vassilas, Opinion, Supreme Court Justices Should 
Have Term Limits, CNN (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/09/30/opinions/ 
supreme-court-term-limits-law-roosevelt-vassilas/index.html [https://perma.cc/URH7-BVG4]. 
Several Democratic lawmakers are reportedly working on such a bill. See Juliegrace Brufke, 
House Democrat to Introduce Bill Imposing Term Limits on Supreme Court Justices, Hill 
(Sept. 25, 2020), https://thehill.com/homenews/house/518195-house-democrat-to-introduce-
bill-imposing-term-limits-on-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/SC4V-MG88]. 
317. See Ryan D. Doerfler & Samuel Moyn, Democratizing the Supreme Court, 109 Cal. 
L. Rev. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 6-7, 22-25), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3665032 
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing that strippingjurisdiction from the Supreme 
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Justices,318 disobey Supreme Court decisions,319 or "pack" the Court with 
additional members.320 
In this environment, the Justices may be reasonably concerned about 
the sociological legitimacy of the Supreme Court-and drawn to the 
approach suggested by Bickel and Sunstein. In an era of political 
turbulence, it may seem that the most effective way to preserve the Court's 
public reputation is either to deny review altogether in high-profile cases 
or to issue narrow doctrines that do not clearly push the law in any specific 
direction. "As much as any time in American history," this may seem like 
"a period for judicial minimalism" at the Supreme Court.321 
1. The Impact of a MinimalistApproach. - Once we consider the entire 
federal judiciary, however, the picture becomes significantly more 
nuanced and complex. Importantly, narrow or opaque (or nonexistent) 
Supreme Court rulings do not simply return a legal issue to the political 
branches-as Bickel and Sunstein have at times suggested.322 The issue 
goes to the lower courts. And, in contrast to the Supreme Court, the lower 
federal courts cannot simply decline review; they have mandatory 
jurisdiction. 323 Accordingly, the lower courts must decide high-profile 
cases, with or without guidance from theirjudicial superiors. For example, 
Court "would favor progressive outcomes immediately" even though the long-term partisan 
impact would be unpredictable); Christopher Jon Sprigman, Congress's Article III Power 
and the Process of Constitutional Change, 95 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1778, 1780-82 (2020) 
(suggesting that broad congressional authority to strip jurisdiction from the Supreme Court 
could "help reconcile constitutionalism with democracy" and thereby "help preserve the 
legitimacy of courts as enforcers of constitutional rules"). 
318. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Opinion, The Case for Impeaching Kavanaugh, 
N.Y. Times (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/20/opinion/kavanaugh-
impeachment.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
319. See Mark Joseph Stern, How Liberals Could Declare War on Brett Kavanaugh's 
Supreme Court, Slate (Oct. 4, 2018), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/10/brett-
kavanaugh-confirmation-constitutional-crisis.html [https://perma.ccV/WV22-AA9C] (arguing 
that "[b]lue states may be pressured to disregard [the] decisions" of a conservative-
dominated court). 
320. See supra notes 9, 213-216, and accompanying text. Just before this Essay went to 
press, a group of House and Senate Democrats introduced legislation to expand the size of 
the Supreme Court from nine to thirteen members. See Carl Hulse, Democrats' Supreme 
Court Expansion Plan Draws Resistance, N.Y. Times (Apr. 15, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2021/04/15/us/politics/democrats-supreme-court-expansion.html (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review). 
321. Sunstein, Kavanaugh Confirmation, supra note 313. 
322. See Bickel, Least Dangerous Branch, supra note 26, at 254 (arguing that, with the 
"all deliberate speed" formula, "[t]he Court placed itself in position to engage in a 
continual colloquy with the political institutions"); Sunstein, One Case, supra note 26, at 
118 (claiming, with respect to affirmative action, that the Court's "complex, rule-free, highly 
particularistic opinions have had the salutary consequence of helping to stimulate" 
democratic debate). 
323. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (2018) (granting the Supreme Court broad 
discretionary certiorari jurisdiction), with id. § 1291 (mandating review by courts of 
appeals). 
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as Seventh Circuit Judge Sykes observed, the Supreme Court has not 
"give [n] us any doctrine about ... how to reconcile conflicts between 
Second Amendment gun rights and the public's right to regulation of 
dangerous instrumentalities."324 Nevertheless, the inferior federal courts 
cannot "duck the hard Second Amendment case .... We need to decide 
it."325 
When the Supreme Court issues a minimalist decision on a high-pro-
file issue (and fails to later clarify the law), the lower federal courts must 
take the lead on the content of federal law. And, without the constraining 
force of broad, rule-like precedents, inferior judges in high-profile and 
contested cases tend to be more influenced by their background ideolog-
ical leanings. That is precisely what worried Thurgood Marshall during the 
Brown Ilargument: Without a firm deadline for desegregation, "the Negro 
in this country would be in a horrible shape" because the enforcement of 
Brown would be "left to the judgment of the district court with practically 
no safeguards." 326 Likewise, in the wake of Casey's undue burden standard, 
there is considerable evidence that Democratic- and Republican-
appointed jurists vote in ideologically predictable directions. 327 As one 
activist lamented, "There's a real recognition that the lower court judges 
hold vast power over women's reproductive lives. "328 
Delegation of high-profile issues to the lower courts not only leads to 
a patchwork of decisions but also poses risks to the inferior federal 
judiciary itself. To the extent that lower courts are in charge of high-profile 
issues, Presidents, senators, and interest groups have a strong incentive to 
focus on the composition of the inferior federal bench-creating a divisive 
process that puts at risk the long-term public reputation of the lower 
courts. As Judge King suggests, a "highly partisan or ideological judicial 
selection process conveys the notion to the electorate that judges are 
simply another breed of political agents, that judicial decisions should be 
in accord with political ideology," and these messages may "undermine 
public confidence in the legitimacy of the [lower federal] courts." 329 
2. Exploring the Legitimacy Tradeoffs. - The goal of this Essay is not to 
argue that the Justices should grant certiorari or issue a broad, rule-like 
doctrine in every high-profile case. There are various reasons that the 
Justices may opt not to hear a case or may struggle to formulate a broad 
324. Sykes, supra note 193, at 2:45:50-2:47:48; see also supra notes 191-192 (discussing 
the lack of clarity in the Court's gun rights decisions). 
325. Sykes, supra note 193, at 2:46:24-2:46:35. 
326. Brown ITranscript, supra note 48, at 400 (quoting Thurgood Marshall). 
327. See supra section II.B.3. 
328. Scherer, supra note 29, at 19-20 (quoting Interview by Nancy Scherer with 
Elizabeth Cavendish, supra note 161). 
329. King, supra note 230, at 782; see also id. ("The loss of public confidence in the 
legitimacy of the courts . . . could, in turn, undermine compliance .... "). 
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doctrine.330 Instead, this Essay seeks to emphasize a point that seems to 
have been overlooked by the literature on sociological legitimacy: the 
potential tradeoffs between the Supreme Court and the lower federal 
courts. 
Relatedly, this Essay aims to inspire both theoretical and empirical 
scholarship on lower court legitimacy. As discussed, virtually all work on 
judicial legitimacy is focused on the Supreme Court. Given the 
increasingly contentious nature of lower court selection-and recent 
attacks on "Obama judges" and "Trump judges"-there is a need to 
systematically examine the lower courts' external reputation among elites 
and the general public. 
At bottom, this Essay contends that scholars and jurists should begin 
to debate whether protecting the Supreme Court's external reputation-
through narrow decisions or certiorari denials-is worth the costs to the 
remainder of the federal bench. That is by no means an easy analysis. 
At the outset, we should recognize that it can be challenging to 
discern whether a broad, rule-like decision will in fact undermine the 
Supreme Court's legitimacy. Consider, in this regard, the reapportion-
3ment cases. When the Court first considered Baker v. Carr, Justices 
Frankfurter and Harlan implored their colleagues to find the issue non-
justiciable; they worried that the Court's sociological legitimacy would be 
severely damaged by entering that "political thicket."332 Yet, as Barry 
Friedman has pointed out, the Court's decisions both to treat the issue as 
justiciable and to adopt the one-person, one-vote rule turned out to be 
quite popular with the public.333 A further complication involves the 
330. See supra note 203 and accompanying text (acknowledging, for example, the 
difficulty of reaching agreement on a multimember Court). 
331. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
332. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (plurality opinion) (Frankfurter, J.) 
(concluding that a challenge to congressional districts was nonjusticiable, and admonishing 
the Court not to enter the "political thicket"); see also Kim Isaac Eisler, A Justice for All: 
WilliamJ. Brennan,Jr., and the Decisions that Transformed America 171-74 (1993) (noting 
that Justice Frankfurter advocated dismissal in Baker v. Carr because he feared that a 
decision on the merits "would constitute such a usurpation of court prerogatives, that it 
would undermine the authority of the Court itself'); Whittington, Political Foundations, 
supra note 96, at 126 (noting that Justices Frankfurter and Harlan both believed that a 
decision on reapportionment "could only damage the Court in the long run"); Tara Leigh 
Grove, The Lost History of the Political Question Doctrine, 90 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1908, 1960-61 
(2015) (discussing Justice Frankfurter's concerns during the deliberations over Baker v. 
Carr).Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Bakerv. Carrunderscored these concerns. See 369 U.S. 
at 267, 277-80 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the reapportionment lawsuits 
should have been dismissed as nonjusticiable and warning that "[d] isregard" of such limits 
"may well impair the Court's position" by undermining "public confidence in its moral 
sanction"). 
333. See Friedman, Will of the People, supra note 28, at 268-69 (noting that, although 
some officials opposed the Court's decisions-and even attempted to strip federal 
jurisdiction over reapportionment issues-the Court's decisions were quickly implemented, 
and stating that "[t]he reason for the prompt action and the defeat of all attempts to 
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Court's sociological legitimacy across time. Brown v. Board of Educationwas 
controversial in 1954, and the Court may have faced resistance if it had 
issued a firm deadline in Brown I." But over time, Brown has become 
canonical (that is, one of the most respected decisions in Supreme Court 
history) ,335 and the Court's failure to do more in Brown Ilhas been viewed 
by many as a tragic mistake.336 It is worth asking whether the Court's long-
term public reputation would have been enhanced by a more rule-like 
implementation scheme for desegregation. 
Nevertheless, despite such examples, commentators-and, more 
importantly, many justices-have long assumed that broad, rule-like deci-
sions in high-profile areas create risks for the Court's external legitimacy. 
The Justices are therefore likely to perceive such a threat and to be 
tempted to issue narrow or open-ended doctrines (or deny certiorari) in 
order to preserve the Court's public reputation. The remainder of this 
section explores whether the perceived benefits to the Supreme Court out-
weigh the risks to the remainder of the federal judiciary. 
Some readers may suggest that the Supreme Court's reputation is far 
more fragile than that of any given inferior federal court (or the lower 
federal judiciary as a whole). The Court's decisions-at least in high-
profile cases such as those involving abortion, affirmative action, or gun 
rights-tend to garner more media attention than those of the lower 
courts. And a Supreme Court decision would likely apply nationwide. 
Accordingly, the effects of a broad, rule-like decision would be felt by 
individuals throughout the country-and for that reason could generate 
considerable resistance. 
Yet the calculus is not so clear. Precisely because of the Supreme 
Court's prominence in our society, it can be far more challenging to attack 
the Court than a single district court judge (or the inferior federal 
judiciary as a whole). Consider some prominent examples of court 
curbing: court packing, jurisdiction stripping, and defiance of court 
orders. An attempt to enlarge the Supreme Court may be far more 
controversial than an expansion of the lower federal judiciary because the 
Court is seen as far more consequential. Some scholars argue that Franklin 
forestall it was obvious: the public loved these decisions"); see also Louis L. Jaffe, Was 
Brandeis An Activist? The Search for Intermediate Premises, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 986, 991 
(1967) ("At least some of us who shook our heads over Baker v. Carrare prepared to admit 
that it has not been futile, that it has not impaired, indeed that it has enhanced, the prestige 
of the Court. It has been a peculiarly popular opinion."). 
334. See supra section IIA.I. 
335. See J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 Harv. 
L. Rev. 963, 1018 (1998) (describing Brown as "[t]he classic example" of a canonical case); 
Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 379, 381 (2011) (arguing that "the 
constitutional canon [is] the set of decisions whose correctness participants in constitutional 
argument must always assume" and "Brown ... is the classic example"). 
336. See Bell, Silent Covenants, supra note 67, at 23 (describing Brown Has a "mistake" 
in large part because it failed to guide and constrain lower federal courts); supra section 
ILA.2 (noting criticisms of Brown Ii). 
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Roosevelt's presidency was severely damaged because of his (unsuccessful) 
attempt to pack the Supreme Court.337 And, as my past work has 
documented, although there are political obstacles to any jurisdiction 
stripping effort, there have historically been more roadblocks in the way 
of attempts to cut off Supreme Court review. 338 Executive officials and 
legislators often prefer the finality and uniformity that comes from a 
Supreme Court decision; accordingly, throughout our history, many 
political actors have defended the Court's jurisdiction, even when they 
anticipated an adverse decision from the high bench. 339 
That brings us to the concern at the heart of sociological legitimacy: 
compliance. A presidential decision to defy a Supreme Court ruling would 
likely create quite a stir. But a presidential decision to disobey a single 
district court ruling (or perhaps multiple district court rulings) might not 
garner as much attention, precisely because it would be seen as less 
consequential. That is, it may be politically easier for a President to defy 
340 an inferior federal court. 
Accordingly, it is not clear which level of the judiciary is better 
equipped to shoulder external criticisms. Consider the case of 
desegregation. Some readers may share Bickel's intuition that the 
Supreme Court in Brown II properly rejected the "shock treatment" 
337. See William E. Leuchtenburg, The Supreme Court Reborn: The Constitutional 
Revolution in the Age of Roosevelt 156-61 (1995). 
338. See Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Safeguards of FederalJurisdiction, 124 Harv. 
L. Rev. 869, 874, 888-916, 920-22 (2011) [hereinafter Grove, Structural Safeguards] 
(providing a detailed review ofjurisdiction-stripping efforts, which underscores the political 
obstacles to taking away the Supreme Court's appellate review power); see also Tara Leigh 
Grove, The Article II Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 250, 253, 268-
90 (2012) [hereinafter Grove, Article II Safeguards] (detailing how the executive branch 
has repeatedly opposed efforts to strip Supreme Court jurisdiction); Tara Leigh Grove, The 
Exceptions Clause as a Structural Safeguard, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 929, 960-62 (2013) 
(discussing other failed court-curbing efforts, including proposals to impose a supermajority 
requirement for striking down federal legislation). 
339. See Grove, Article II Safeguards, supra note 338, at 285; Grove, Structural 
Safeguards, supra note 338, at 920-22. 
340. The picture is further complicated by the possibility that district courts may issue 
nationwide or universal injunctions. Presidents may be more inclined to defy such broad 
orders. And yet the high-profile nature of such injunctions may also help insulate the district 
judges who issue them. For a small sample of the rich literature on this topic, see Samuel L. 
Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 417, 420 
(2017) (characterizing nationwide injunctions as a "recent development" in the history of 
equity and advocating that federal courts should issue only "plaintiff-protective 
injunction[s]" that restrain defendants' conduct "only with respect to the plaintiff'); 
Amanda Frost, In Defense of Nationwide Injunctions, 93 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1065, 1069 (2018) 
(offering a "qualified" defense of nationwide injunctions as "the only means" in certain 
cases "to provide plaintiffs with complete relief and avoid harm to thousands of individuals 
similarly situated to the plaintiffs"); Mila Sohoni, The Lost History of the "Universal" 
Injunction, 133 Harv. L. Rev. 920, 924 (2020) (arguing that federal courts have issued 
nationwide injunctions for "well over a century" and that "the Article III objection to the 
universal injunction should be retired"). 
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proposed by the NAACP and instead allowed a more gradual approach 
through the "all deliberate speed" formula.341 But Judge Wisdom offered 
a very different assessment. Precisely because desegregation was a fraught 
issue, Judge Wisdom argued that "[t]he Supreme Court ... has an 
obligation to lead or at least point out the logical line of development of 
the law. "342 
CONCLUSION 
Scholars have largely overlooked the legitimacy tradeoffs within our 
judicial hierarchy. To avoid sacrificing the sociological legitimacy of the 
Supreme Court, the Justices may decline to issue the broad, rule-like 
precedents that will most effectively clarify the law and guide lower courts 
in high-profile cases. Instead, the Justices may issue narrow doctrines or 
deny review altogether. Such an approach not only sacrifices meaningful 
legal change but also poses risks to the long-term legitimacy of the inferior 
federal judiciary. To the extent that our legal system aims to protect 
sociological legitimacy, we should consider not simply the Supreme Court 
but the entire federal bench. 
341. Bickel, Least Dangerous Branch, supra note 26, at 250, 252-53. 
342. Wisdom, supra note 84, at 420. 
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